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The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace 
 
-- VAND. L. REV.  -- (forthcoming) 
 




For decades, energy policy has struggled to reconcile two distinct visions 
for the future: the first seeks ever-more-competitive, efficient, and dynamic 
electricity markets; while the second seeks an ever-greener mix of electricity 
generation sources.  Caught within this push-and-pull dynamic is the regulatory 
contract—a nineteenth-century concept that stands more for ordered regulation 
than competitive markets.  This Article examines how piecemeal pursuit of two 
energy visions has produced mismatches between rapidly evolving markets and 
governance institutions that cannot change as quickly.  To better evaluate these 
mismatches, the Article develops a framework that accounts not just for market 
operation and environmental externalities, but also the technical constraints of 
grid operation and electricity fuels.  Relying on the experience of nuclear power, 
the Article creates an account of how a fuel source can be priced out of the 
market despite its apparent advantages in reliability and air emissions.  With this 
understanding, the Article evaluates the political economy and governance 
challenges associated with diverse policy options aimed at better capturing 
valuable attributes of electricity.  Ultimately, this analysis furthers our 
understanding of the regulatory contract in the marketplace, suggesting an 




The regulatory contract is undergoing a profound reformation.  Once a cornerstone of 
progress dating at least to the Industrial Revolution, the model—under which an entity “clothed 
with the public interest” assumes basic duties and submits to price regulation in exchange for a 
monopoly franchise—has been used to build everything from bridges to power lines.1  Markets, 
however, have become the norm for many formerly regulated industries, leaving vestiges of 
regulatory regimes that fit awkwardly with competition.2  This is nowhere more apparent than in 
                                                
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. 
± Professor of Law, Politics & Regulation, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas, and Professor of 
Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
1 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (upholding price regulation of grain elevators affected with the public 
interest); see also The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. The Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 
557 (1837) (McLean, J., conc.) (referencing contractual relationship between government and bridge proprietors); 
Jersey Central Power & Light v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., conc.) (providing 
description). 
2 The debate between those who favor markets and those who favor regulations undergirds many of the issues we 
address here.  One can find tensions between the two throughout the scholarly literature, spanning decades.  See, 
e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:  Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 
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energy policy, particularly as it struggles to reconcile two distinct visions for the future of 
electricity:  the first seeks ever-more-efficient and dynamic markets; the second seeks ever-
greener, low-impact electricity. 
Pursuit of both visions has effected significant change in how electricity is valued—and 
at the intersection of this push-and-pull dynamic is the regulatory contract.  The days of state-
regulated utilities providing electricity monopoly service to customers are waning, replaced by 
dynamic wholesale markets populated by merchant generators. 3   In wholesale electricity 
markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) operates not so much as a rate-
setting agency, but as the overseer of a regionally operated market.4  In states that have embraced 
retail competition, state public utility commissions (PUCs) fill a similar role; traditionally 
regulated states continue to set rates, but struggle to efficiently interface between their retail 
interests and those of the wholesale market.5  States are no longer simply parties to this contract, 
nor are they the only parties to it.  Rather, states are now only one of several regulatory entities 
influencing markets.  
Along with the move toward competitive markets, efforts to encourage cleaner electricity 
have also had a significant impact on the electricity sector.  Indeed, some of these efforts have 
been intertwined with the move toward markets.  The energy crises of the 1970s, for example, 
produced the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),6 a statute aimed at both 
incentivizing cleaner electricity and ensuring its access to the grid.7  State renewable portfolio 
standards (RPSs) and Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) also emerged from this era, further 
pushing alternative electricity resources that could compete in the market against traditional 
sector, particularly for fossil-fueled electricity.  The Clean Air Act (CAA),8 for example, now 
regulates more pollutants, from more plants, more stringently, than ever before. 9   The 
                                                                                                                                                       
HARV. L. REV. 547, 550 (1979) (“Too many arguments made in favor of government regulation assume that 
regulation, at least in principle, is a perfect solution to any perceived problem with the unregulated marketplace.”); 
Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 
(2015) (illustrating that prevailing preference in behavioral law and economics for market-based approaches to 
market failures artificially excludes traditional regulatory tools like direct mandates); Robert E. Litan, Evaluating 
and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 21 (1985) (arguing deregulated 
financial institutions could behave in ways that increase risk); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV.  1349, 1362-63 (2011) (describing how behavioral economics bears on market/regulation 
debate).  
3 See infra Part I (developing evolution of electricity markets). 
4 See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o)(b)(1) (giving FERC authority to regulate bulk power 
system reliability); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540, 21,543 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888] (requiring open access 
for transmission); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding FERC’s 
permitting market-based rates). 
5 See infra Part III.B.2. (describing relevant litigation). 
6 Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45).  
7 See infra Part I.B (discussing these developments). 
8 Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q). 
9 See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (adding provisions for 
toxics and acid rain); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding greenhouse gases to be within CAA 
definition of “air pollutant”); JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41914 
regulations for coal-fired power). 
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) recent proposals to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from fossil-fueled generators are just the latest steps in that process.10 
What are the impacts of these changes? Some argue competitive pressures will bring 
about a utility “death spiral,”11 environmental regulation will produce a “train wreck”12 of 
inadequate generating capacity, and both forces will set grid reliability back decades.13  Others 
welcome disruptive technologies and business models,14 arguing that a green, market-based 
system is impossible without a complete overhaul of traditional utility law.  The stakes are high:  
electricity disruptions cost billions of dollars;15 poorly designed markets are vulnerable to 
manipulation;16 more than half a million people die each year from the health impacts of coal-
fired emissions;17 and the need to mitigate and adapt to climate change is only growing more 
urgent.18   The governance challenges and implications alone are staggering, and, at this point, 
anything but clear.19 
                                                
10 See, e.g., Proposed Rule: Standards for Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Power Stationary 
Sources:  Electric Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014); Proposed Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 
11 Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/1zELmhT (using term 
“death spiral” to describe impacts of market changes on traditional utilities); see also EDISON ELECTRIC INST., 
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC 
BUSINESS, at 3 (Jan. 2013) (“an old-line industry with 30-year cost recovery of investment is vulnerable to cost-
recovery threats from disruptive forces”).   But see William Pentland, Why the Utility “Death Spiral” is Dead 
Wrong, FORBES, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2014/04/06/why-the-utility-death-
spiral-is-dead-wrong/ (arguing utilities’ good credit ratings belie the death spiral argument). 
12 See MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 9, at 1-3 (summarizing train wreck argument). 
13 See, e.g., Steven Fine et al., Potential Impacts of Environmental Regulation on the U.S. Generation Fleet: Final 
Report, EDISON ELECTRIC INST./ ICF INTERNAT’L (Jan. 2011), available at: 
http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2011IRP/EEIM
odelingReportFinal-28January2011.pdf.   But see SUSAN F. TIERNEY & CHARLES CICCHETTI, THE ANALYSIS GROUP, 
THE U.S. GENERATION FLEET” (2011), available at 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/EEI_PeerReview_Tierney_Cicchetti%20_M
ay2011.pdf (criticizing Fine et al.). 
14 See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff:  Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 (2014) (arguing for regulatory changes to enable disruptive grid technologies); Jim Rossi & 
Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2013) (criticizing 
preemptive federal law for stifling innovation).  
15 U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2004), available at 
https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.  
16 For discussions of the manipulation of wholesale electricity markets in California, see Jaqueline Lang Weaver, 
Can Energy Markets Be Trusted:  The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUSTON BUS. & 
TAX L.J. 1 (2004); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the 
Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131 (2012). 
17   Jennifer Duggan, China’s coal emissions responsible for ‘quarter of a million premature deaths,’ THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/dec/12/china-coal-
emissions-smog-deaths; M. Rajshekhar, Premature deaths due to emissions from thermal plants to rise two-three 
times in India: Report, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, available at 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-09/news/56879425_1_dioxide-india-urban-emissions.   
18 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY 
FOR POLICY MAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf  
(synthesizing comprehensive set of reports). 
19 See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. (In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig.), 715 F.3d 716 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2899 (2014) (considering preemptive sweep of Natural Gas Act’s provisions 
Draft – April 8, 2015 – please do not cite without permission 
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Policymakers, courts, and scholars have made important contributions to understanding 
each of these issues.20  What is missing from the discussion, however, is an integrative 
framework—an analytical approach that permits disciplined consideration of how all of the 
concerns raised above work together.  In this Article, we develop such a framework—one that 
accounts not just for market operation and environmental externalities, but also the technical 
constraints of grid operation and electricity fuels.  Implicit in our approach is the view that the 
market-based and environmental imperatives need not trump one another, notwithstanding the 
tensions between them.  Moreover, any vision of the energy future ought to also seek to 
maximize reliability.  Obtaining low-cost, low-impact, reliable electricity is a tall order, but we 
believe that a self-conscious analysis of exactly what the trade-offs are is a prerequisite to 
reaching that goal.    
After developing our tripartite framework, we make it concrete using the example of 
nuclear power.  Nuclear power, once heralded as the clean energy of the future,21 has been priced 
out of the market despite its apparent advantages—the absence of carbon or other emissions, its 
inexpensive fuel, its reliability, and its admirable safety record in the United States.  Using our 
framework, we show how the struggle between the environment imperative and the market 
imperative, as mediated by politics and perceptions, has led to this counter-intuitive outcome.  
This analysis tests our framework, demonstrates its broader workability, and helps 
identify various policy options that can better reconcile the parameters of cost, environmental 
impact, and reliability.  Bringing our analysis full circle, we then construct a typology of policy 
options.  Some of the options we present are prompted by our analysis in this Article; others are 
drawn from current experimentation and proposals developed in the existing literature.  By 
paying careful attention to how these options fit within our tripartite framework, we can identify 
the mechanisms by which they would either alter the markets, or alter the value of what is traded 
on the markets.  This exercise provides insights into the practicability of each option, but it also 
demonstrate regulatory federalism turned on its head, with increasing heterogeneity at the 
subnational level.  Indeed, this suggests future research needs—most critically, the need to 
                                                                                                                                                       
that are read in pari material with similar Federal Power Act provision); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 
F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed Jan. 15, 2015 (holding Order 745 invalid as beyond FERC’s 
jurisdiction and concluding pricing rationale was arbitrary and capricious); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 
F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed Dec. 10, 2014 (holding New Jersey effort to compensate new generation 
for capacity market disparities was preempted by Federal Power Act); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 
467 (4th Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed  Nov. 26, 2014 (similar). 
20 See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014) (exploring 
awkward fit between markets and traditional concept of public utility, particularly as related to climate change 
issues); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58-62 (2014) 
(surveying FERC’s attempts to adapt Federal Power Act to clean energy goals); Jim Rossi, The Electricity 
Deregulation Fiasco:  Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision 
of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768 (2002) (exploring problem of providing public goods in markets); David 
B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 806-08 (2008)(describing the 
problem of capacity assurance in competitive markets); Amy Stein, Distributed Reliability, Working Paper (2015) 
(on file with authors); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. 
L. REV. 291 (2011) (arguing climate change mitigation of is utmost importance and providing overview of pros and 
cons of various fuel-related changes). 
21 See infra Part II.B (describing early optimism). 
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consider how various proposals would compliment or hinder one another if implemented 
simultaneously.22   
Ultimately, this analysis furthers our understanding of the regulatory contract in the 
marketplace.23  The move to a green, competitive electricity market has not eliminated the 
regulatory contract: the law continues to charge regulators with many of the same duties under 
competition as it did under price regulation. And holders of private capital continue to rely on 
those legal institutions in deciding whether to invest in the provision of electric services.  But 
what was once mandated and compensated by regulatory fiat under the old system is now bought 
or sold in a competitive market.  We show how these changes create new roles for all parties to 
the contract.  
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the shift from traditional rate regulation 
to competitive markets for electricity.24  To ensure an appreciation for the technical aspects of 
electricity, this part provides an overview of how the electric grid is operated.25  Next, Part I lays 
out our analytical framework, providing details on how three criteria—cost, reliability/flexibility, 
and externalities—are valued (or not) in electricity markets.26  The final section of Part I 
considers the theory and practice of markets, drawing heavily from the economics literature to 
further contextualize our framework. Part II offers a full analysis of the “nuclear risk 
premium,”27 identifying where it comes from, why it exists, and how it is that this low-emission, 
reliable technology is disadvantaged in competitive markets.  We demonstrate that a combination 
of regulatory pressures, risk perception mechanisms, and market flaws has prevented competitive 
markets from valuing nuclear power’s desirable attributes as fully as they were valued under the 
traditional regulatory contract.  Part III begins by delving into the political economy of modern 
electricity markets, emphasizing the governance challenges posed by the changing regulatory 
contract. Next, we examines a series of policy options that address the market’s failure to 
optimize cost, reliability, and environmental value.28  In so doing, we consider various objections 
and legal hurdles to the options, but we do not ultimately offer a hard-and-fast prescription.  
Rather, we hope that our framework furthers the search for a principled analysis for the energy 
policy decisions that matter most today and that arise in the future.  We conclude with some 
observations about the implications of our analysis for regulation, and regulated industries, in 
general.       
 
I. Electricity Markets and the Grid 
 
The last three decades have seen dramatic change in the relationship between energy 
regulators and prospective investors in electric generating plants.  That change has played out in 
                                                
22 The need is particularly strong as states grapple with the implications and uncertainties of EPA’s proposed Clean 
Power Plan.  See infra Part III.B.2. (describing state’s reluctance to adopt policy options in light of uncertainty 
regarding Clean Power Plan). 
23 This analysis may also be relevant to other traditionally regulated industries that interface with markets, such as 
communications.  See Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service:  What a 
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2015) (providing framework for considering future 
net neutrality rules). 
24 See infra Part I.A. 
25 See infra Part I.B. 
26 See infra Part I.C. 
27 See infra Part II. 
28 See infra Part III.A. 
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an iterative back-and-forth between market participants and policymakers, and it has yielded a 
new regulatory environment that entails considerably more risk for prospective investors than 
their twentieth-century counterparts ever faced.  In order to understand why that is, it is 
necessary to understand how electricity markets work, how the electric grid works, and the roles 
of different types of generation sources in the electric system—both historically and today.   
 
A. The Evolution of Modern Markets  
 
  Built on the back of a regulatory contract, the American electric grid developed to serve 
the relatively localized needs of investor-owned utilities (IOUs).29  But it soon grew into an 
enormous, interconnected set of systems of mostly alternating-current transmission and 
distribution lines.30  Although IOUs dominated the industry, other kinds of electric service 
providers—primarily municipal utilities and rural cooperatives—grew up in areas left unserved 
by IOUs.31   These interconnected systems comprise three grids in the continental United States: 
the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Texas Interconnection.32  
Within each of these three systems, virtually every generator of electricity is connected (however 
indirectly) with virtually every consumer of electricity.33   
Because electricity cannot be stored in commercial quantities economically, the grid must 
be kept in balance: that is, at any given point in time, the amount of electricity being dispatched 
to the grid by generators must equal the amount being taken off the grid by consumers.34  If loads 
are not balanced, the system will fail, causing blackouts for example.  To keep loads in balance, 
the operators of the grid must marshal information about historic usage patterns, weather 
forecasts, generators’ operational plans, and the like to estimate levels of supply and demand in 
the near-term and longer-term future.35  With that information, operators can have generation 
                                                
29 For summaries, see JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT:  EDISON, TESLA, WESTINGHOUSE AND THE RACE TO 
ELECTRIFY THE WORLD (2004); JOHN F. WASIK, THE MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM INSULL, THOMAS EDISON AND THE 
CREATION OF THE MODERN METROPOLIS (2008). 
30 Generally we use the term “transmission” to refer to the movement of electric current over longer distances at 
higher voltages (so-called bulk power transfers), and “distribution” to refer to the delivery of electricity at lower 
voltages from high-voltage transmission lines to end-users.  “Voltage” is a measure of the electric potential between 
two points and is the basis for rating transmission or distribution lines.  Generally, transmission lines move power at 
voltages exceeding 110 kilovolts (kV); some transmission lines, however, move power at voltages in excess of 1000 
kV. Distribution lines move power at less than 110 kV, typically between 4 and 34.5 kV.  For a primer on these 
topics, see generally JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS (2010). 
31 See infra note [10] (describing other electricity providers). 
32The Texas interconnection is separated from the remainder of the American grid primarily to avoid federal 
jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act (FPA).  See David B. Spence & Darren Bush, Why Does ERCOT Have 
Only One Regulator?, in ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: THE TEXAS STORY (L.  KIESLING & A. KLEIT, eds. 2009) at 
9. 
33 It is this interconnectedness, along with the tendency of electric current to flow along the path of least resistance 
(often across state lines), that subjects most electricity transmission to federal regulation under the FPA.  See 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b) (claiming federal jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce)”; FPC v. 
Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) (affirming Federal Power Commission (FPC) jurisdiction on this 
basis).  
34 The North American power grid is maintained a frequency of 60 Herz (Hz).  If the grid strays too far from this 
frequency, the system fails.  CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 30, at 47-48. 
35  See Matt Davison et al., Development of a Hybrid Model for Electrical Power Spot Prices, 17 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 257, 260 (2002) (“It is known that power demand is tightly linked to weather and 
follows predictable seasonal and diurnal patterns.”). 
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resources ready to dispatch power, or demand-side resources ready to curtail their usage, when 
needed.36 
For most of the history of the American electric system, these balancing services were 
performed almost exclusively by IOUs, which provided monopoly service to their customers.  
IOUs generated most of the power they sold and supplied it over lines they owned.37  Rate 
regulation protected consumers against monopoly pricing, and ensured that utilities would earn a 
reasonable rate of return on most of their investments in generation.38  On those rare occasions 
when utilities found it necessary to buy wholesale power from a neighboring utility during times 
of shortage, they coordinated these transactions informally, knowing that the cost of the 
transaction would be recovered through rates.39  FERC exercised ratemaking jurisdiction over 
wholesale power sales, and state PUCs regulated retail rates.40  Utilities controlled access to the 
grid, and had little need to access wholesale power markets.  For these reasons, merchant 
generators—those selling primarily into wholesale markets—were virtually unheard of prior to 
the late 1970s.  
This state of affairs predominated in the electricity industry well into the 1990s.  The 
generation mix came to be dominated by utility-owned plants using conventional fuels—first 
coal, hydroelectric, and oil facilities, and later natural gas and nuclear facilities.  The seeds of 
change, however, were sown more than a decade earlier with the passage of PURPA.41  PURPA 
introduced non-utility generators into the market42 and incentivized renewable generation, which 
led to the construction of hundreds of merchant wind, solar, biomass, small hydro and gas-fired 
cogeneration facilities across the United States.  These nonutility generators, in turn, created 
pressure for nondiscriminatory access to the electric grid so that they could sell their electricity 
directly to retailers or industrial customers.  In 1996, FERC promulgated Orders 888 and 889, 
which mandated (a) unbundling electricity transmission from electricity sales, and (b) that 
owners of transmission lines act as common carriers providing transmission service on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to affiliated and non-affiliated companies alike.43  Along with this 
                                                
36 See P. Jazayeri et al., A Survey of Load Control Programs for Price and System Stability, 20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON POWER SYS. 1504, 1504 (2005) (describing demand-side resources).  
37 A sizeable minority of customers receive their electric service from government entities—municipal utilities or 
other governmental agencies, like the Tennessee Valley Authority—or rural electric cooperatives.  See BOSSELMAN 
ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 2 § B.2.b (4TH ed. forthcoming 2015) (surveying various 
types of service providers). 
38 Id., at ch. 8, section B.2 (describing the basic principles of rate regulation). [Note typical approach is either 
prudent investment or used and useful—cross-reference to discussion for nuclear.] For a discussion of these 
concepts, see Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); and Duquesne Light Co. 
v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
39 This informal coordination was managed through “power pools,” voluntary associations of IOUs and municipal 
utilities established to facilitate coordination along utility boundary lines.  CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 30, at 56. 
40 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (limiting federal jurisdiction over power sales to wholesale sales in interstate commerce). 
41 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45. 
42 PURPA promoted both electricity conservation programs and alternative forms of electricity production by 
providing financial incentives to new, nonutility producers of renewable electricity and cogeneration, designated as 
qualifying facilities (QFs).  18 C.F.R. pt. 292.  
43 Order 888, supra note 4; Open-Access Same-Time Information System  (Formerly Real-Time Information 
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
37) [hereinafter Order 889]; see also 16 USCS § 824j (providing for open access to transmission lines under some 
circumstances); New York v. FERC, 531 U.S. 1 (2002) (upholding Order 888). Under Order 888, transmission 
providers are required to file open access transmission tariffs (OATTs), which must meet various criteria.  See 18 
C.F.R. § 35.28 (describing requirements).   
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unbundling, FERC authorized most wholesale sellers of electricity to charge market-based 
rates.44   
At around the same time, some American states began to introduce competition and 
market-based rates into their retail markets, with California, Texas, and New York leading the 
way.45  As part of this restructuring, incumbent utilities in these competitive retail markets sold 
most of their generation assets or spun them off into subsidiaries, increasing the profile of 
independent merchant generators, marketers and brokers within the industry.  This led to sharp 
increases in the number and volume of arms-length transactions on wholesale electricity markets, 
straining the capacity of both the transmission grid and regulators.46  In response, FERC pushed 
owners of transmission lines to form “independent system operators” (ISOs) and “regional 
transmission organizations” (RTOs) to help manage the provision of transmission services and 
oversee wholesale power markets.47     
Today, these ISOs/RTOs manage the day-to-day operation of wholesale power markets, 
schedule ancillary services (reserves necessary to balance load), and ensure that there is 
sufficient generating capacity over the long term to meet projected demand.48  They can ensure 
adequate reserves in either or both of two ways. One way is by relying on the price signal, as is 
done in the ERCOT system in Texas.49 A second approach is to create and manage separate 
capacity markets, in which owners of electricity generating facilities are paid to have capacity 
available in the event that it is needed in the future. 50  In the PJM, New England and New York 
systems, for example, the relevant ISOs run capacity markets like these. 
Today, there are seven major ISOs or RTOs in the United States, managing a significant 
portion of the power grid.51  In parts of the grid not so managed—mainly the southeast and the 
                                                
44 See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding FERC’s use of market-based rates).  
45 See EIA, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 74–77 (2000), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf. (providing overview of 
restructuring). 
46 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) tracks wholesale power transactions at individual trading 
hubs.  At the NEPOOL hub (located in the New England), there were about 1500 trades completed in 2001, 
involving approximately 1.37 million megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity; in 2013, there were more than 6700 
trades involving 5.76 million MWh.  EIA, WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL GAS MARKET DATA (2015) 
available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/#history. 
47  See Order 888, supra note 4, at 21,595-96 (establishing requirements for ISOs); Regional Transmission 
Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg 809 (Jan. 6, 2000) (similar for RTOs).  For purposes of this analysis, 
there is no meaningful distinction between ISOs and RTOs.  
48 The term “reserves” refers to generating capacity that is currently unused but which is available to serve load; if 
that capacity is already running, so that operator may dispatch its electricity to the grid on very short notice, it 
qualifies as “spinning reserves.” “Regulation” services are the grid management activities that maintain frequency 
and voltages at their proper level, to ensure grid reliability.  Willett Klempton & Jasna Tomić: Vehicle-to-Grid 
Power Fundamentals: Calculating Capacity and Net Revenue, 144 J. POWER SCIS. 268, 275 (2005).  
49 THE BRATTLE GROUP, ESTIMATING THE ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL RESERVE MARGIN IN ERCOT 1 (2014); see 
also infra Part III.B.3. (describing ERCOT’s approach to capacity); William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” 
Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy, JFK SCH. OF GOV’T, HARV. UNIV., at 134 (2005) (noting energy-
only markets change, but do not eliminate, regulatory interventions). 
50 See ISO NEW ENGLAND, WHAT IS A CAPACITY MARKET?  (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.iso-
ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/cap_mkt/index.html) (explaining capacity markets). 
51 The seven are: the New England ISO (ISONE), covering the New England states; the New York ISO; the PJM 
Interconnection (PJM), stretching from the Chicago area to the mid-Atlantic states; the Midcontinent ISO (MISO), 
stretching from Minnesota south to south-central part of the country (excluding Texas); the Southwest Power Pool 
(SPP), covering portions of the plains states; the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT); and the California 
ISO.   
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mountain west—the old system of IOU-centric markets, power pools, and traditional rate 
regulation prevails. 
 
B. The Operation of Competitive Wholesale Markets 
 
In competitive wholesale power markets, prices are determined by the forces of supply 
and demand rather than regulatory fiat. Prices are set in two settings: (a) longer-term bilateral 
power purchase agreements (PPAs); and (b) real-time or day-ahead spot markets.52   In the PPA 
setting, a generator or other wholesale seller bargains with a retailer or other buyer to reach a 
contractual agreement. Spot markets, by contrast, are multilateral, and the price is established 
through an auction—a bidding process that establishes a market clearing price for individual 
time increments during the day.53  Market prices must satisfy the Federal Power Act’s (FPA’s) 
requirement that rates be just and reasonable,54 and FERC has long determined that both PPA 
prices and spot market prices satisfy this standard.55   
Despite the widespread use of PPAs, grid operators do not take PPAs into account in their 
dispatch decisions.  Rather, when the grid operator dispatches power from individual electric 
generating facilities to the grid, it does so on a least-cost basis.  That is, from any status quo level 
of demand, as the next increment of power is needed to satisfy additional demand, the grid 
operator dispatches power from the available generating facility that is willing to provide the 
power at the lowest cost.  Generally, grid operators deviate from this priority rule only to ensure 
the security of the power system—to avoid severe congestion or other operational problems that 
could be associated with dispatching the least-cost unit. Thus, the grid operates on a “security-
constrained, least-cost dispatch” or “security constrained economic dispatch” (SCED) rule.56  
This rule protects ratepayers from paying unnecessarily high (unjust and unreasonable) rates, and 
applies both in traditionally regulated systems and in competitive wholesale markets.57     
Ideally, competitive wholesale spot markets work in sync with the SCED principle.  For 
each time increment during the day, sellers and buyers submit their bids indicating how much 
they are willing to pay and accept, respectively, for power.  The operator matches buyers’ and 
sellers’ bids and determines the market clearing price, which all sellers will receive and buyers 
will pay, for power dispatched to the system during that time increment.  Sellers should bid into 
the market at a price that reflects their short-run marginal cost of supplying power, that is, the 
cost of providing one additional unit of power.58  A large number of factors can influence the 
                                                
52 Most electricity retailers secure power using both PPAs and the spot market; in some wholesale markets all power 
deliveries are priced through the spot market, and PPAs serve only as a price hedging mechanism.  See Bob Mango 
& John A.C. Woodley, The Inevitable Commoditization of Electric Power Markets, 132 FORTNIGHTLY 27, 31 
(1994) (describing use of contracts as hedges for spot markets). 
53 For a discussion of the operation of modern spot markets, see BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, ch.10. 
54 FPA § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
55 See FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Corp., 350 U.S. 348 (1956) (applying the principle to power sales contracts under 
the FPA); United Gas Pipeline v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) (applying the principle to natural gas 
contracts under the Natural Gas Act); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(upholding FERC’s use of market-based rates).  
56 For a basic description of SCED, see FERC, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH:  DEFINITION, 
PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf. 
57 Id. 
58 See William B. Hogan, A Competitive Electriciy Market Design:  A Wholesale Primer, JFK SCH. OF GOV’T, 
HARV. UNIV., at 5 (1996) (describing relationship of short-run marginal costs to bidding). 
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marginal cost of dispatching a particular plant at a particular time. For example, a thermal plant 
operating at less than full capacity will have a lower marginal cost of providing the next unit of 
power than it would if it had to provide the additional power from a cold start.  Sometimes, the 
plant with the lowest marginal cost is located in the wrong place, such that dispatching power 
from that plant will cause congestion that threatens security of the system.  Taking these and 
other factors into consideration, the operator may perform this market clearing function for 
multiple locations (nodes) within the system, and may adjust prices to reflect congestion—so-
called “nodal” pricing, or locational marginal pricing (LMP).59   
In theory, dispatch decisions could incorporate not only the generator’s costs, but social 
or external costs (such as estimated costs of pollution emitted by the generator) as well.60   In 
practice, no grid operator does so.  Instead, the SCED principle means that public policies 
favoring renewable power influence dispatch decisions only indirectly, by impacting the price at 
which sellers will be willing to sell (and buyers to buy) power into the system at various time 
increments the following day.  For example, the production tax credit for renewable generators 
depresses the willingness-to-accept bids of qualified renewable generators by paying them 
approximately two cents per kilowatt-hour (kwh) of power dispatched to the grid.61  State 
renewable portfolio standards can have a similar effect on willingness-to-accept bids, because 
sellers earn revenue from the sale of renewable energy credits for each kwh dispatched to the 
grid.62   
From this description it should be evident that competitive wholesale electricity markets 
entail much more price risk (for parties on both sides of the market) than traditionally regulated 
electricity markets.   The PPA is one way to hedge that price risk.  Least-cost dispatch rules may 
prevent the seller from delivering power to the buyer, but the sale obligation (at the contract 
price) remains, requiring a financial settlement between buyer and seller.  Wholesale electricity 
market participants can use energy derivatives to hedge risk as well.63  
In sum, energy markets have undergone fairly profound changes over the last few 
decades, and the regulatory contract has changed along with them.  Fifty years ago informal 
associations of IOUs kept the grid operating cooperatively, knowing that rate regulation 
insulated them from price risk.  Now, in much of the country, those informal arrangements have 
been replaced by arms-length market transactions that subject the market participants to price 
risks.  What is the role of the regulatory contract in this setting?  Even where cost-of-service 
ratemaking remains the norm, the line between FERC’s and PUCs’ jurisdiction has shifted.64  
The Supremacy Clause dictates that states must permit state retailers to pass wholesale costs 
through to customers, and generators that sell into the wholesale markets must take the market 
price.65  Thus, we increasingly rely on spot markets to provide the best signals to investors about 
                                                
59 See TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., ALTERNATING CURRENTS:  ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY 90-91 
(2002) (explaining LMP). 
60  Indeed, economists and engineers have proposed algorithms for these kinds of “environmental/economic 
dispatch,” or “social cost dispatch,” systems.  See infra Part III.B.3. (discussing this approach). 
61 For most of the last three decades Congress has enacted tax credits for renewable power sources.  The production 
tax credit has hovered around 2 cents per KWh.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45 (1.5 cents/KWh).   
62See EPA, RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2015) (describing renewable energy credits). 
63 See Spence & Prentice, supra note 16, at 150-54 (describing growth of energy derivatives markets). 
64 The line is anything but clear.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 19 (providing overview of litigation). 
65 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 356 (1988); see Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. v. 
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 965 (1986) (“interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC must be given 
binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates”).  The latter point, as it relates to capacity 
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the optimal mix of fuel sources, storage, and demand-side resources, raising the question whether 
markets can meet that challenge.66   
 
C. Electric Generation:  Serving Markets and the Grid 
 
In competitive wholesale electricity markets, generators and other wholesale sellers seek 
to maximize revenue from the sale of power. By contrast, grid operators seek to keep the grid 
and wholesale power markets running smoothly and efficiently.  In this section we evaluate 
different electricity generation sources from the grid operator’s point of view, using three sets of 
criteria:  (1) cost; (2) reliability/flexibility; and (3) negative externalities.  Obtaining reliable 
electric service that is as inexpensive as possible implies a mix of different kinds of electricity 
generation—some that can operate efficiently at high outputs in order to supply base load, and 
others that can react efficiently to sudden changes in demand by ramping up and down quickly 
and at a reasonable cost. Moreover, fuel diversity also protects the public against the cost effects 
of sudden or sharp increases in the price of a particular fuel.  Toward this end, state utility laws 
typically articulate the goal of a diverse generation mix.67  Although the environmental and 
social costs of electricity generation are not a direct component of grid dispatch and are not 
directly valued on the wholesale market, they are of concern to EPA and the states, and the 
object of their regulatory attention, which puts pressure on the electricity market structure.  This, 
in turn, raises a number of important questions about the boundaries of regulators’ jurisdiction 
(both horizontal and vertical), a point to which we also return in Part III.   
There are tradeoffs to be made between minimizing out-of-pocket cost to ratepayers, 
having a generation mix that is flexible enough to ensure reliability, and minimizing negative 
externalities.  Each of the major electricity generation source types—coal, natural gas, nuclear, 
hydro, wind and solar68—bring different strengths and weaknesses to the task of serving these 
various goals.  Some are more costly than others. Some can ramp up and down more efficiently 
                                                                                                                                                       
markets, is the subject of PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed Dec. 
10, 2014; and PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed  Nov. 26, 2014. 
66 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005) (identifying flaws that undermine these goals).  
67 See e.g., DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 26, § 1007 (2015) (directing Delaware state regulators to ensure that utilities 
consider fuel diversity in acquiring new capacity); FLA. STAT. § 403.519 (2015) (directing Florida Public Utilities 
Commission to consider need for fuel diversity and supply reliability when determining need for new power plant); 
id. § 366.05 (authorizing Florida commission to require installation of particular generation sources upon finding of 
insufficient fuel diversity in state’s generation mix); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 164 (McKinney 2015) (making fuel 
diversity one of the evaluative criteria in New York’s electric generation siting approval process). 
68 We focus on these five sources because the first four comprise the majority of electric generation today (ninety-
two percent in 2013), and because the last two, along with natural gas, comprise the majority of projected future 
growth in generation (more than ninety-five percent).  See EIA, FAQ:  WHAT IS U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY 
SOURCE, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); EIA, NATURAL GAS SOLAR 
AND WIND LEAD POWER PLANT CAPACITY ADDITIONS IN FIRST HALF OF 2014 (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17891.  Our consideration of solar power focuses on central station 
solar serving the grid, not distributed rooftop solar.  Note that this list does not include energy storage or demand 
side resources; these resources supply energy or load reductions to the grid, respectively, but in much smaller 
amounts.  Nevertheless, the framework we develop in this Article can be applied to these other resources as well.  
See Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Compensation in 
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 69 (2013) (analyzing jurisdictional issues 
associated with demand response).   
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and quickly than others. And of course, some have much more significant environmental costs 




Naturally, IOUs and investors jealously guard their cost data,69 but many entities publish 
estimates of the relative costs associated with different electricity fuels.  We begin with the 
levelized cost of energy (LCOE).  The LCOE represents the real-dollar cost per kilowatt-hour 
(kwh) of building and operating an electricity generation plant over the financial and operating 
life of the plant.  Thus, it includes capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and variable operating and 
maintenance (O&M) costs, and financing costs.70  Investors care about LCOE because it 
represents an estimate of the average amount of money the plant owner must earn over the 
plant’s life in order to break even on the investment.  These estimates are based on a large 
number of assumptions, and here, for illustrative purposes only, we present data from two 
sources—the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the consultant Lazard.71   
                                                
69 Thus, we are unable to present figures for bid prices in the wholesale markets.  
70 EIA, LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, at 1 (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [hereinafter EIA LCOE Estimates]. 
71  Id.; LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 8.0 (Sept. 2014), available at 
http://www.lazard.com/PDF/Levelized%20Cost%20of%20Energy%20-%20Version%208.0.pdf [hereinafter 
Lazard’s LCOE Estimates].  Assumptions relate to plant size, plant capacity factors, cost of capital, fuel costs, and 
various other market conditions. Given the numerous assumptions inherent in LCOE estimates, care should be taken 
to understand these assumptions before comparing the figures presented in various studies.  For other studies, see 
Black & Veatch, Cost and Performance Data for Power Generation Technologies (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/nrel-cost-report.pdf. [hereinafter B&V Study]; MIT, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR 
POWER (2003 & 2009 update), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ [hereinafter MIT Study]. 
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aUnless otherwise noted, reported estimates assume technologies currently in use, without carbon capture. 
bCT means combustion turbine.   
cCCNG means combined cycle natural gas plant. 
dEIA assumes advanced nuclear, reflecting current new construction and a dual-reactor plant.72  Lazard also 
incorporates current new construction but presumes a single-reactor plant. 
ePV means photovoltaic solar.  The reported estimates are for central station PV rather than rooftop PV. 
fCSP means concentrated solar, a thermal technology that heats water into steam to drive a turbine. 
 
 
Several observations regarding the data deserve emphasis.  First, they are for new 
construction,73 and generally reflect the existing regulatory landscape.74  We provide more detail 
on the contours of that landscape in Part II infra, but note for now that different sources face 
different regulatory regimes, as well as very different assumptions about the future regulatory 
                                                
72 The Advanced Nuclear technology assumes the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design, which is being installed at 
the Vogtle site, as described infra Part II.C.  See EIA, UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY SCALE 
ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS, at 12-1 (2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf (describing assumptions). 
73 EIA’s figures assume plants will begin operating in 2019.  EIA LCOE Estimates, supra note 70, at 6. 
74 Subsidies for some fuel sources are calculated by EIA, but not presented here.  EIA LCOE Estimates, supra note 
70, at 3.  EIA also assumed an added 3% to the cost of capital for greenhouse-gas intensive technologies, reflecting 
investor concerns rather than the regulatory landscape.  See id. at 2-5; see also EIA, ASSUMPTIONS TO THE ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 6 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/assumptions/pdf/introduction.pdf. 
[hereinafter EIA Assumptions]. Lazard assumes carbon capture technology at the high end of its coal and CCNG 
estimates.  Lazard LCOE Estimates, supra note 71, at 2. 
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landscape.75  Given those assumptions, the traditional base load sources—coal and nuclear—are 
significantly more expensive than CCNG, new onshore wind farms, or (according to Lazard), 
new central station photovoltaic solar plants.  This observation is consistent with the relative lack 
of planned new construction for coal and nuclear, and the growth of natural gas-fired and 
renewable generation.76   
Second, a closer look at the components of LCOE provides a sense of the relative capital 
costs of newly constructed plants.  On a per-megawatt-hour (MWh) basis, the capital costs of 
nuclear, wind, solar PV, and coal are quite high compared to CCNG.  EIA estimates the levelized 
capital cost at $71.4/MWh for a new nuclear facility (74% of LCOE), $114/MWh (88% of 
LCOE for solar PV), $64/MWh (77% of LCOE) for wind, and $60/MWh for a coal facility (63% 
of LCOE).77  By comparison, the corresponding capital cost estimate for CCNG is only 
$14.3/MWh (21% of LCOE). 78   Note that for nuclear, high capital costs reflect longer 
construction periods (and hence, higher financing costs), more specialized components, and the 
need for highly skilled labor, among other things.79   
Finally, note that the LCOE data reported in Figure 1 include assumptions about the 
“capacity factors,” that is, the percentage of time the plants will be dispatching into the grid over 
their projected lifetimes. Because investors must pay the capital costs of new plants up front, 
they must try to predict capacity factors over the forty-plus year life of the plant.  If these 
facilities have higher capacity factors than assumed in the analysis, their capital costs per MWh 
will be lower; if the facilities have lower capacity factors, capital costs per MWh will be 
higher.80  Even in traditionally regulated markets controlled by vertically-integrated IOUs, 
capacity factors may be difficult to predict, given reliance on SCED and the possibility of drastic 
changes in relative fuel prices, costs imposed by new regulations, and the rise of disruptive new 
technologies.  However, in traditionally regulated markets, investors who overestimate their 
facility’s capacity factors often expect that they will nevertheless recover their capital costs and a 
fair rate of return.81  Not so in competitive wholesale markets, where the SCED rule will 
ultimately determine plant revenues.  Further, the capacity factors for intermittent renewables 
like wind, solar, and some hydro are not directly comparable to the others because their 
generating time is not driven by grid operators, but rather on natural conditions.82   
Another factor important to investors, and included in LCOE, is the cost of fuel.  Fuel 
costs are a key component of fossil-fueled plant’s variable operations and maintenance (O&M) 
                                                
75 For a different calculation of LCOE that considers the impact of a carbon cost, see MIT Study (2009 update), 
supra note 71, at 6.  This study predicts that a cost of $25 per ton of carbon would make the LCOE of nuclear fall 
below that of coal and natural gas.  Id. 
76  EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK, 2014:  MARKET TRENDS, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_electric.cfm (“[n]atural gas-fired plants account for 73% of capacity additions 
from 2013 to 2040 in the Reference case, compared with 24% for renewables, 3% for nuclear, and 1% for coal”). 
77 EIA LCOE Estimates, supra note 70, at 6. 
78 Id. 
79 See Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 53-54 (2012). 
80 Many nuclear power plants have obtained amendments to their licenses permitting uprates, meaning they can now 
run at higher capacities than initially permitted; others have canceled their uprate requests in light of lower capacity 
needs. EIA 2014 Assumptions, Electricity Market Module, supra note 74, at 101. 
81 There are numerous provisos, some of which are considered infra Part II.C. 
82 Id. at 3.  Even comparing generators’ capital costs on the basis of nameplate capacity (that is, dollars per unit of 
energy the generators can produce), the upfront investment in a nuclear plant is 6 or 7 times that of CCNG facility, 
and 4 times that of a solar PV or wind farm.  Lazard’s LCOE Estimates, supra note __, at __.  See also Black & 
Veatch, supra note 000, at 9-48 (providing similar relative ordering). 
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costs, and are thus an important component of those plants’ short-run marginal costs (which will 
form the basis of market bid prices).83  Natural gas prices are projected to remain relatively low, 
due in large part to the shale gas revolution.  Wind and solar generation have no fuel costs, so 
their variable O&M costs approach zero.  Nuclear also has competitively low fuel costs (lower 
than coal).84  Thus, EIA estimates the variable O&M costs of natural gas the highest ($49-
82/MWh), followed by coal ($30/MWh), nuclear ($12/MWh), hydro ($6/MWh) and wind and 
solar ($0/MWh).85  Taking all of the above data into consideration (not only variable O&M), it 
stands to reason that in competitive energy markets the cost criterion will point investors toward 
new gas-fired, wind and solar power, and away from coal-fired and nuclear power. 
Remember that these cost data reflect estimates for new generating facilities, averaged 
over the useful life of the facilities.  But the U.S. generation fleet includes existing generating 
plants that have been operating for decades, and may have recovered all or a significant portion 
of their capital costs through regulated rates.  To the extent that these plants can operate after 
their capital costs have been paid, they can offer power to the grid at prices that are below their 
levelized costs.  For example, consider again nuclear power’s low fuel costs compared to coal; 
the nuclear fuel costs also differ from coal in that they do not vary with plant output over the 
short run.86  Thus, the short-run marginal costs for nuclear power ought to be nearly zero.87  Why 
then, are many older nuclear power plants built in the 1970s and 80s not able to submit 
competitive bids into American spot markets?   
The full answer to that question is developed in Part II, but note that regardless of fuel 
source, the logic of bidding (and of the SCED rule) in competitive spot markets does not ensure 
that plant owners will earn a positive return on investment.  First, sometimes plants with 
competitive bids are not dispatched due to technical grid issues.  Second, even if a plant is 
dispatched, the plant will not earn a positive return on investment unless the average market-
clearing price over time exceeds the plant’s long-run average costs.88  Further, public policies 
and market forces have depressed short-run marginal costs in the industry.  The shale gas 
revolution has depressed natural gas prices, and hence, marginal cost-based bids from natural 
gas-fired generators.  As described in the next section, natural gas is a peaking fuel, so its costs 
tend to drive the clearing price.  Increasing penetration of zero-marginal-cost renewables, along 
with renewables subsidies, also depresses bids from those sources such that spot prices in some 
markets are sometimes negative.89  An additional competitor, providers of demand-response 
(DR) services, ought to further depress market prices over the long run as well.90  Overall, these 
forces increase the percentage of time when market clearing prices fall below some plants’ long-
run average costs.  
 
                                                
83 The marginal operating cost will also include fixed O&M, like service on debt, and, in the case of nuclear, 
payments for insurance, decommissioning, and waste management.  See infra Part II.D. (discussing these costs). 
84 EIA LCOE Estimates, supra note 70, at 6.  
85 Id. 
86  WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR POWER (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Economic-Aspects/Economics-of-Nuclear-Power/. 
87 NUCLEAR ECONOMICS CONSULTING GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER & SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://nuclear-economics.com/nuclear-power-short-run-marginal-cost/. 
88 Long-run average costs reflect the total of a plant’s marginal costs averaged over its lifetime.  Id.   
89 See id. (providing details). 
90 See generally Eisen, supra note 68 (explaining role of DR in energy markets and debate over how DR should be 
compensated in those markets). 
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2. Reliability/Flexibility  
 
A diversity of generation fuels makes the overall system flexible, promoting grid 
reliability.  Some generation sources can respond quickly to changing system needs, while others 
excel at providing the constant power needed to serve base load.  A diverse mix ensures efficient 
use of these attributes.  Generally, existing coal-fired and nuclear plants were designed to run at 
full capacity for extended periods to serve base load, and they do not cycle (turn and off) or ramp 
up and down as efficiently as gas-fired or hydroelectric plants.91  By forcing a coal-fired power 
plant to cycle more frequently (or ramp more quickly) than its design specifications suggest, for 
example, the operator imposes excess wear and tear on the plant, and emits more pollution per 
MWh of power produced than it would by remaining within design specifications.92  Natural gas 
combustion turbines, by contrast, were designed for load following:  they can cycle and ramp 
much more efficiently and quickly than coal-fired or nuclear plants.93  
Because of their intermittency, neither wind nor solar facilities can provide the load-
following services offered by fossil-fueled plants.  To the contrary, their intermittency increases 
the load-following burden on grid operators by adding another source of short-term variation in 
addition to variations in demand.94  Wind and solar facilities vary the amount of power they 
supply to the grid, but because their marginal costs are so low, their power tends to be dispatched 
to grid whenever they are operating.  When the wind stops blowing or changes speed, or the sun 
stops shining, grid operators must call on other resources to balance loads.95 
Because reliability is dependent on a mix of generation characteristics, it is also sensitive 
to the availability and cost of fuel.  Like coal, for example, uranium is relatively inexpensive and 
worldwide reserves are considered substantial.96  Moreover, both coal-fired and nuclear power 
plants have storage capacity:  coal can be stockpiled onsite, and nuclear fuel assemblies last 
about eighteen months to two years.  This capacity hedges the risk of supply interruptions, 
further enhancing these sources’ reliability for electricity generation.  The history of natural gas-
fired power is different.  Historically, natural gas prices were relatively high and volatile, 
                                                
91 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, MANAGING LARGE-SCALE PENETRATION OF RENEWABLES 11 (Apr. 20, 2011), 
available at http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/intermittent-renewables-full.pdf (describing cycling and ramping).  The 
only hydroelectric plants that can follow load are those operated in storage mode; many such plants, however, 
operate in run-of-the-river mode, meaning that the amount of water passing through the turbines is equal to the 
amount of flow entering the reservoir from upstream; this is done to keep the reservoir at a constant level.  See 
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, ch. 6 (setting forth legal regime for hydropower).  
92 J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in Integrating Large Levels of Wind 
Power Generation, 23 ELEC.  J. 33, 35 (2010). 
93 See generally B&V Study, supra note 71 (listing ramp rates and “quick start” rates for various generation 
technologies); MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 91, at 11, 27 (providing various ramping rates and noting that 
ramping a nuclear plant quickly requires more operator involvement, increasing the risk of operator error).   
94 See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 91, at 17-21 (describing system impacts of intermittent generation). 
95 For this reason, many have argued that natural gas pairs well with intermittent renewables because of its load-
following capabilities.  E.g., Puga, supra note 92.  Demand-side resources also have a role to play in this regard. 
Eisen, supra note 68, at 79-80. 
96  Davis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 59. Also like coal, uranium is available domestically.  
However, currently only about 17% of uranium delivered in the United States is of U.S. origin.  EIA, 2013 
URANIUM MARKETING ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/pdf/2013umar.pdf. More than half the enrichment, however, takes place in 
the United States. Id. at 2.  The Nuclear Energy Institute reports that efforts are underway to revitalize the U.S. 
uranium production industry.  NEI, NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY:  ABUNDANT SUPPLIES OF URANIUM, 
http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/Nuclear-Fuel-Supply (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). 
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reflecting both periodic insecurity about domestic supply and the relative lack of storage capacity 
on the interstate pipeline system.97  The shale gas revolution, however, now holds the prospect of 
price stability and ample domestic supply for the future.98  But natural gas-fired power plants are 
still dependent on the interstate and local pipeline systems through which they acquire their fuel; 
fuel is typically not stored on site.99  
Of course, for wind, solar and hydro plants, respectively, their “fuels”—wind, sun and 
water—are produced locally, and are essentially free of charge.  Rather, the primary threat to 
reliability for these technologies is weather-induced intermittency—the possibility that the sun 
won’t shine, the wind won’t blow, or river flows will be too low.  For that reason, EIA classifies 
these three technologies as “non-dispatchable,” meaning that they cannot be counted on to 
deliver power when needed the way fossil-fueled and nuclear plants can.100  Moreover, we can 
make a distinction between the predictability of power from these sources and its variability.  
Wind power, in particular, can be variable in ways that affect generation output.  Forecasters 
may be able to predict that the blades of the wind turbine will be turning one hour from now; 
however, it may be difficult to predict exactly how fast they will be turning (and therefore, how 
much power the turbine will be generating).  Proponents of wind and solar power argue that a 
suite of geographically distributed wind and solar power plants could be counted on to serve a 
specified level of load reliably because the sun won’t stop shining, or the wind stop blowing, 
everywhere at the same time.101 
  
3. Negative Externalities and Risk 
 
All electric generation technologies produce negative externalities—harm to health, 
safety and the environment over their full life cycle.102  The extraction of coal, natural gas, 
uranium and silicon (or other minerals used in manufacturing PV cells) creates safety hazards for 
workers as well as air and water pollution.  Manufacturing power plant components and PV 
cells, not to mention the construction of generating facilities, entails various other risks to human 
health and the environment. Fossil-fueled, nuclear and concentrated solar power all use large 
amounts of water.  Fossil-fueled combustion discharges pollutants to the air, produces water 
effluent and, in the case of coal combustion, generates solid wastes (coal ash). Hydroelectric 
                                                
97 In the 1970s the country faced a severe natural gas shortage, triggering forms of rationing.  Subsequent price 
deregulation triggered production increases.   See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Evolution of Natural Gas 
Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, 53 (1995).  However, by the end of the 20th Century analysts were 
anticipating the need to import LNG to serve domestic demand, and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included 
provisions intended to incentivize terminal construction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (2012). 
98 See Don Mason, Report Predicts 20 Years of Stable Natural Gas Prices, FUEL FIX, Jan. 16, 2014 (crediting shale 
gas revolution for projections of price stability).  
99  See Order 787, Communication of Operational Information Between Natural Gas Pipelines and Electric 
Transmission Operators, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,164 (Nov. 22, 2013) (permitting natural gas and electric transmission 
operators to share non-public information to facilitate reliability and integrity for interconnected systems).  See also 
FERC Staff, Winter 2013-2014 Operations and Market Performance in RTOs and ISOs, AD14-8-000, at 8 (Apr. 1, 
2014) (concluding significant electric generator outages occurred during polar vortex, often related to gas 
curtailments, lack of fuel diversity, and frozen coal). 
100 See EIA LCOE Estimates, supra note 70, at 6. 
101 See e.g., Michael Milligan & Rory Artig, Reliability Benefits of Dispersed Wind Resource Development, NREL 
(1998), available at http://distributedwind.org/assets/2013/05/Reliability-Benefits-of-Dispersed-Wind-Resource-
Development.pdf. 
102 For a source-by-source overview of these externalities, and the regulatory regimes governing them, see generally 
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37. 
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facilities interrupt fish migration routes, flood land, change water chemistry, and interrupt scenic 
vistas, as do wind farms.  The list goes on.   
Here, we summarize the externalities of electricity generation that produce the most 
salient and direct harms to human health and the environment.103   Of course, many of these 
harms are better conceived as risks, characterized by a predicted magnitude of harm multiplied 
by the probability that the harm will occur.104  Thus, researchers can conduct risk assessments of 
the adverse health impacts resulting from the air emissions associated with fossil fuel 
combustion; or characterize the water quality risks associated with the discharge of heat in 
effluent from thermal power plants.  For those uncertain harms, there is often a gap between risk 
as assessed mathematically, and risk as perceived by stakeholders, a topic we examine in more 
detail in Part II.  
First, it is well established that air emissions from fossil-fueled combustion entail 
significant risks to health and the environment.  Coal combustion, in particular, produces 
significant harm to public health by emitting carbon dioxide (CO2), the most common 
greenhouse gas, and nitrogen oxides (NOx), precursors of both acid rain and ground-level ozone 
(smog); so does natural gas, though in smaller amounts.105  In addition, coal combustion is a 
major source of emissions of (a) sulfur dioxide (SO2), a precursor of acid rain, (b) particulate 
matter (PM), an inhalation hazard, and (c) mercury (Hg), ingestion of which poses a risk to 
neurological development.106  Methane—the primary component of natural gas—is itself a 
greenhouse gas far more potent than CO2.107  Indeed, even though coal combustion emits twice 
the carbon dioxide of natural gas combustion, there is an ongoing scientific debate over whether 
coal-fired power or natural gas-fired power produces more GHG emissions over its full life 
cycle.108  Natural gas, however, produces a tiny fraction of the deadly PM emitted by coal 
combustion.  Of course, EPA regulates all of these emissions, at least to some extent, under the 
Clean Air Act, 109  though its GHG emissions regulation is neither finally set nor fully 
implemented.110   
Second, coal-fired and nuclear power production entail particularly thorny waste disposal 
issues.  For coal-fired power the problem is coal combustion residuals, commonly called fly 
                                                
103 We so limit our analysis with some hesitation.  The externalities associated with fuel extraction (coal, natural gas, 
uranium, and silicon) and hydropower development are considerable.  See James Conca, How Deadly is Your 
Kilowatt? We Rank the Killer Energy Sources, FORBES, June 10, 2012,  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/06/10/energys-deathprint-a-price-always-paid/ (considering entire 
fuel cycle); NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIS., HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY:  UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY 
PRODUCTION AND USE 64-153 (2010) (providing analysis of electricity fuels). 
104 See infra Part II.B. (describing differences between risk assessment, risk perception, and risk management). 
105 Natural gas-combustion produces half the CO2 emissions of coal combustion and 20 percent as much NOx 
emissions.  BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, ch. 5. 
106 Natural gas combustion produces a fraction of 1 percent of the amounts of SO2 and PM produced by coal 
combustion, and no mercury emissions.  Id. 
107 Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 6435 (2012). 
108 See generally id. (summarizing these issues). 
109 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401. PM, NOx and SO2 are regulated as conventional pollutants under the Act.  For 
a description of that regulatory scheme, see David B. Spence & Emily Hammond, Electric Power Generation Fuels, 
in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW (JODY FREEMAN & MICHAEL GERRARD, eds., 2d ed. 2014).  EPA just 
recently began to regulate mercury emissions from coal-fired plants.  See White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. 
EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (summarizing history).   
110 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 20, at 28-42 (2014) (summarizing EPA’s efforts).  
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ash,111 a high-volume waste112 the storage of which has resulted in several high-profile spills of 
toxic ash into rivers over the last decade,113 triggering an EPA decision to regulate coal ash 
storage and disposal under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.114  For nuclear power 
the problem is spent fuel and other radioactive wastes.  These include low-level wastes, which 
are produced in relatively high volumes but which pose less danger to human health and the 
environment; and high-level wastes, especially the used nuclear fuel itself, which are currently 
being stored across the country in spent fuel pools or canisters.115  Both are highly regulated, but 




As is evident from the discussion above, the three attributes in our framework—cost, 
reliability/flexibility, and externalities—are not uniformly distributed amongst the fuel sources 
for electricity.  We turn now to a diagnostic account of the theory and practice of markets and 
regulation.  This discussion helps situate the interaction of our three attributes within the 
economic literature, and it also suggests reasons why the electricity markets have difficulty 
minimizing cost while also maximizing reliability and minimizing negative externalities.   
    
D.  Markets:  Theory and Practice 
The under-supply of a sufficiently reliable and green power supply is a frequent lament in 
energy policy circles.  Economic theory tells us that a well-functioning competitive market will 
maximize social net benefits, thereby providing society with a generation mix that balances cost, 
reliability, and externalities in a way that maximizes our collective utility.117  According to that 
                                                
111 When coal is burned for electricity generation, it creates both “fly ash”—the PM that is collected in pollution 
control equipment under the CAA—and “bottom ash”—the heavier ashes that are too heavy to be airborne and that 
are collected through the bottom of coal furnaces.  It can contain a variety of heavy metals like lead, arsenic, and 
chromium. Spence & Hammond, supra note 109, at 472-73. 
112 In 2012 coal-fired power plants in the United States generated over 109 million tons of CCRs. See AM. COAL 
ASH ASS’N, 2012 COAL COMBUSTION PRODUCT (CCP) PRODUCTION & USE SURVEY REPORT, http://www.acaa-
usa.org/Portals/9/Files/PDFs/revisedFINAL2012CCPSurveyReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).    
113 See e.g., Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798 (E.D.N.C. 2014) 
(granting in part and denying in part Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss CWA complaint involving coal ash spill); see 
also Proposed Rule, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System:  Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals 
From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128, 35,146-48 (June 21, 2010) (describing additional catastrophic spills).  
For EPA’s final rule, see Final Rule, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal 
Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, -- Fed. Reg. -- (December 19, 2014). 
114 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128.  
115 For an overview, see Spence & Hammond, supra note 109, at 486-87. 
116  See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021c (2012); New York v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating portions of the Act on Tenth Amendment grounds).  For a 
summary of the history of high-level waste policy in the United States, see Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential 
Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763 (2012) [hereinafter Hammond, Deference 
Dilemma]; see also Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (designating Yucca Mountain as 
geologic repository for high-level waste); In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mandating that NRC 
continue with licensing process for Yucca Mountain). 
117 More specifically, such market will produce a distribution of goods that is Pareto optimal, in that no other 
distribution of goods can make one or more members better off without making one or more members worse off. 
See GEORGE C. HOMANS & CHARLES CURTIS, JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO PARETO 277-81 (1934) (explaining Pareto’s 
ideas on collective utility). 
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view, regulation ought to be aimed at getting prices “right” and otherwise creating conditions 
that mimic textbook competition.118  An alternative view places less faith in the ability of 
markets to produce socially optimal outcomes, and insists on a role for government intervention 
in markets to correct certain kinds of market failures.119   
In particular, many economists prescribe getting prices right as the solution to electric 
reliability problems.  More specifically, some economists worry that in competitive wholesale 
markets, prices based on marginal costs will not attract sufficient investment in new capacity—
referred to as the “missing money” problem.120  The reason that money is missing,” they say, is 
because consumers are insulated from the movement of wholesale prices by fixed-price retail 
contracts or tariffs, and because many wholesale markets operate under price caps imposed by 
regulators.121  In a perfect world, both wholesale and retail power prices would fluctuate freely 
and in real time, allowing both supply and demand to respond to price changes. Temporary price 
spikes would induce immediate demand reductions, and ultimately, lower prices; if not, 
sustained high prices would provide a sufficient reward for investment in adequate generation 
resources, ensuring reliability.122 
However, even where smart meters would enable retailers to offer dynamic pricing, it has 
remained elusive, notwithstanding that numerous pilot studies have demonstrated its benefits.123  
Many consumers seem to prefer the security of fixed-price contracts, fearing downside risks and 
failing to appreciate the possibility of saving money in the long run.124 This loss aversion 
dynamic may be even more powerful for prospective investors in power plants, for both logical 
and behavioral reasons.125  Economists describe the problem as one of “asset specificity.”  In a 
competitive market, when a firm’s assets are constructed at a particular location for a particular 
purpose, that firm faces the risk that its contractual counterparties (those from whom it buys or to 
whom it sells) will act opportunistically, taking advantage of the firm’s lack of alternative 
options to “hold up” the firm on price.126   
                                                
118 See generally LYNN KEISLING DEREGULATION, INNOVATION, AND MARKET LIBERALIZATION: ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING IN A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING ENVIRONMENT (2008) (conceptualizing electricity markets as 
complex adaptive systems in which price signals will stimulate innovation and create value). 
119 See e.g., Boyd, supra note 20, at 1620 (conceptualizing electricity markets at “common, collective enterprise of 
building and elaborating the institutions, regulatory structures, and business models that will be necessary to realize 
a low-carbon future”). 
120 Peter Cramton & Steve Stoft, The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity: A White 
Paper for the California Electricity Oversight Board 8-11 (Apr. 25, 2006), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cramton/34/ (describing missing money problem). 
121 See id. (providing examples); Pierce, supra note 66, at 468-77 (canvassing state restructuring experiences). 
122 See William W. Hogan, On and “Energy Only Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy, JFK SCH. 
GOV’T, HARV. UNIV. 6-8 (2005) (explaining idealized energy-only model). 
123 See generally Ahmad Faruqui & Jennifer Palmer, Dynamic Pricing and Its Discontents, 34 REGULATION 16 
(2011). 
124 This notion finds ample support in the behavioral psychology literature, which explains that the fear of loss 
invokes the emotional part of the brain, leading people to pay to avoid downside risk.  Antoine Bechara, et al., The 
role of the amygdala in decision-making, 985 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 356 (2003); Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding 
advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy, 275 SCI. 1293 (1997). 
125 For a simple explanation of the behavioral psychology risk aversion literature, and its impacts on investment 
decisions, see JAMES MONTIER, BEHAVIOURAL INVESTING:  A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL 
FINANCE 447-52 (2007). 
126 Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: an Empirical Evidence, in THE 
NATURE OF THE FIRM: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 121-22 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. 
Draft – April 8, 2015 – please do not cite without permission 
21 
 
Power plants are characterized by asset specificity: they are often capital intensive, 
geographically immobile investments.  In these situations, it might be dangerous to assume that 
arms-length transactions in the market will produce more efficient outcomes than vertical 
integration would have.127  One might therefore expect risk-averse investors to be more reluctant 
to invest in power plants in competitive electricity markets, and for this dynamic to be 
particularly strong for especially long-lived investments with especially large up-front costs, 
such as nuclear (and to a lesser extent, coal-fired) power plants.  Indeed, energy consultants 
contend that this dynamic is accelerating the reduction in fuel diversity, exacerbating grid 
reliability problems.128  A future grid consisting mostly of gas-fired and renewable power (the 
only technologies experiencing growth) poses reliability challenges for grid operators.  
Integrating intermittent sources like wind and solar on a larger scale makes grid balancing more 
difficult.  Gas-fired plants can back up wind because they can ramp efficiently, but they face 
their own reliability challenges:  they cannot store fuel on site, are at the mercy of pipelines for 
supply, and natural gas prices have tended to be more volatile than fuel prices for any other 
generation source.  In sum, the combination of incentives posed by the markets as they currently 
operate may decrease reliability over time. 
Markets also struggle with pricing externalities, and the economics literature on 
environmental externalities has long recognized pollution as a kind of market (or pricing) failure.  
That literature goes back to Arthur C. Pigou,129 and generally endorses pollution taxation as the 
most efficient way to internalize environmental externalities, with marketable permits as a 
second-best alternative.130  The Coase Theorem challenged the Pigovian prescription by arguing 
that governments are unlikely to get taxation levels right; instead it posits that if property rights 
are assigned to conflicting parties, they will negotiate an outcome more likely to maximize social 
benefits.131  Others have been skeptical of market solutions; Garrett Hardin’s famous “tragedy of 
the commons” analysis offered government regulation as the solution to such problems.132   
                                                                                                                                                       
Winter, eds., 1991); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (noting particular trouble asset specificity poses for spot markets). 
127 Noting that asset specificity was the norm in the electricity industry, Paul Joskow argued prior to restructuring 
that reliance on anonymous spot market transactions to supply electricity is likely to fail “because the sinking of 
relationship-specific investments transforms a large numbers bargaining situation into a small numbers bargaining 
situation ex post,” creating opportunities for buyers or sellers to extract rents from the other and a consequent 
disincentive to invest in capacity.  Joskow, supra note 126, at 123-25.   
128  IHS ENERGY, THE VALUE OF US POWER SUPPLY DIVERSITY (July 2014), available at 
https://www.ihs.com/info/0714/power-diversity-special-report.html. 
129 ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 185-226 (1920 & AMS Press 1978).  Pigou is commonly 
credited with providing the first argument in favor of pollution taxes to force polluters to internalize pollution costs 
they would otherwise shift to society. 
130 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
(1990); PIGOU, supra note 129, at 185-89. Specifically, Pigou addresses the problem of smoke produced by factory 
chimneys in England in the early 20th century. Id. at 186 n.3. Within EPA, economists have championed the case of 
market-based regulation since the early 1970s.  Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. 
INTEREST 69 (1970). 
131 Coase’s conclusion was based on some stylized assumptions, including that the transaction costs of negotiating 
were zero. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
132 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1247 (1968); see also Coase, supra note 131 
(noting unrealistic nature of assumption that transaction costs of bargaining to a solution are zero, and that it “is 
normally the case [that] a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the 
problem through the market or the firm may be high”). 
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In practice, American policymakers have historically eschewed market incentives as well 
as private litigation for resolving pollution problems.133  Instead, prescriptive and proscriptive 
rules have been the norm—what most economists refer to, somewhat derisively, as command-
and-control regulation.  Most of the CAA’s approach to emissions from electricity generation 
falls into this category, as does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) licensing regime 
for nuclear power plants.134  The seemingly intractable difficulty of environmental law is that 
these pollutant- and industry-specific regimes represent ad hoc responses to the externality 
problem, producing neither socially optimal pollution levels nor a level playing field among 
generators competing in wholesale electricity markets.  For example, various studies reveal coal 
combustion to produce negative social net benefits, imposing large mortality, morbidity, and 
environmental costs on society from non-GHG air pollutants alone.135  One study estimated such 
costs at $53 billion per year, compared to less than $1 billion per year for natural gas.136  Thus, 
numerous sources argue that the regulated levels of air emissions permitted by the CAA for coal-
fired power are too high.137  Nuclear and renewables, of course, emit none of those same 
pollutants.138   
In sum, the legal landscape for electricity stitches together a mix of market-based and 
regulatory approaches.  The flaws in each have contributed to the electricity market’s failure to 
maximize cost, reliability, and the internalization of environmental harm.  Further, the quickly 
changing markets and concomitant push for a greener grid have placed a marked strain on the 
traditional regulatory contract.  The story of nuclear power provides a cogent example.        
 
II. Nuclear Power in the Marketplace 
  
In this Part, we consider how the nuclear licensing regime affects the competitiveness of 
nuclear power in modern electricity markets. After setting forth an overview of the federal 
regulatory scheme, we develop an account of the nuclear risk premium and show how it relates 
to the story of nuclear power historically and today. With that analysis in place, we can develop a 
concrete narrative of how the regulatory contract is increasingly strained in the marketplace.         
  
A. Federal Nuclear Power Regulation 
                                                
133 The major exceptions are the acid rain program enacted by Congress in 1990, which employs a marketable 
permit regime to effect reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, and the use of renewable energy credits in many state 
RPS programs.  See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, ch. 5.   
134 See infra Part II.A. (describing scheme). 
135 Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1649 (2011); see also sources cited supra note 103 (comparing life-cycle costs of various fuels).  
136 Id. at 1669. 
137  Id. at 1672; see also Paul R. Epstein, et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal in “Ecological 
Economics Reviews,” 1219 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73 (2011) (positing that if coal’s externalities were internalized, 
the price of electricity from that source would double or triple); Melissa Fry Konty & Jason Bailey, The Impact of 
Coal on the Kentucky State Budget, MTN. ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., available at 
http://www.maced.org/coal/documents/Impact_of_Coal-Exec_Summary.pdf (concluding net benefits of coal were 
negative) (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); Press Release, National Academy of Sciences, Report Examines It in Health 
and Environmental Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U.S. (Oct. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/NAS%20study%20on%20costs%20of%20energy.pdf 
(estimating annual non-climate related external damages from 406 coal-fired power plants to be $62 million, or 
about 3.2 cents per KWh).  
138 Muller et al. supra note 135, at 1669. 




As noted in Part I, nuclear power faces very high capital costs and low fuel costs.  It is a 
dependable, if not entirely flexible, source of power to the grid. In these ways, it is similar to 
coal-fired power, the other traditional base load source of electricity.  However, nuclear power 
produces far fewer externalities than coal-fired power.  Indeed, the existing nuclear regulatory 
regime has minimized such externalities far more effectively than environmental regulation does 
for nuclear power’s base load competitors.139  Congress and the nuclear agencies developed this 
regulatory regime, however, against the implicit assumption that the traditional regulatory 
contract would make this regime economically feasible.  
Beginning in 1946, Congress gave the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) “decisive 
control” over the entire field of nuclear energy.140  This authority included both military and 
civilian nuclear energy, a lineage that even today contributes to negative risk perceptions of 
nuclear power and mistrust of AEC’s successor agency, the NRC.141  Intent on emphasizing 
civilian nuclear power development, Congress shifted AEC’s mandate in 1954, and the agency’s 
primary policy mission became facilitating the emergence of the entire civilian nuclear power 
industry.142  Nonetheless, most of the American fleet of commercial reactors commenced 
construction in the 1960s and 70s, a period in which the cold-war threat of nuclear annihilation 
loomed in the public consciousness.  As described above, this was also a period in which cost-of-
service ratemaking encouraged capital investment in generation and transmission.143   
                                                
139 See supra note 103 (collecting source).  For purposes of this section, we focus primarily on externalities 
associated only with electricity generation and describe the regulatory scheme unique to nuclear power.  Some 
externalities associated with nuclear power are regulated under the same regime as those associated with other 
thermal generation. For example, both nuclear power and fossil-fueled generation must comply with the Clean 
Water Act’s (CWA’s) intake water and point-source discharge requirements. National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing 
Facilities and Amend Requirements at Phase I Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,300 (Aug. 15, 2014). Air emissions for 
nuclear power plants, however, are handled under the NRC licensing regime, while those of fossil-fueled plants are 
subject to the CAA.  See Richard Goldsmith, Nuclear Power Meets the 101st Congress, A “One-Act” Comedy:  
Regulation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensees Under the Clean Air Act, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 103 (1992).  
Although new and proposed CAA regulations seek to reduce air-emission externalities of fossil-fueled power 
generation, those externalities persist and are not present for nuclear generation.  See Muller et al. supra note 135, at 
1669 (explaining nuclear was omitted from analysis because it does not emit pollutants in question).  Finally, some 
states require siting approval for all new generation, including environmental assessments and certificates of public 
convenience and necessity.  EDISON ELEC. INST., STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY (Oct. 
2013), available at 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/State_Generation_Transmission_Siting_Directory.pdf.   
140 H.R. REP. NO. 80-1973, at 3 (1948); see also Edward H. Levi, The Atomic Energy Act:  An Analysis, BULL. OF 
ATOMIC SCIS., Sept. 1, 1946, at 18 (describing AEC’s “complete domination over atomic energy development in this 
country”).  See generally Dean C. Dunlavey, Government Regulation of Atomic Industry, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 295 
(1957) (providing comprehensive, contemporaneous review of AEA of 1954). 
141 See, e.g., TERRENCE R. FEHNER & F.G. GOSLING, DEP’T OF ENERGY, ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
TESTING, 1951-63, at 109-10 (2006) (describing thousands of dead sheep and other concerns about fallout from 
above-ground testing); Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 116, at 1780-81 (describing concerns about AEC 
that motivated creation of NRC). 
142 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2297h-13 
(2006 & Supp. 2009); see Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 116, at 1780 (describing history and structure 
of AEC). 
143 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1052, 1052 (1962) (arguing cost-of-service approach leads to overinvestment in capital); see also Leon 
Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974) 
(demonstrating this effect for power plants).  But see W. Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Effect Been 
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The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) vests responsibility with NRC for licensing nuclear 
power plants and ensuring their “adequate safety.”144  The licensing process is thorough, strict 
and resource-intensive; it comprises site selection, design, and construction and operating 
phases. 145   Applicants must perform environmental reviews as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),146 as well as various generic rules NRC has issued over the 
years.147  Applicants must either be regulated public utilities or satisfy stringent financial 
qualifications to engage in the proposed activities,148 and at the beginning of operations, they 
must provide “reasonable assurances” that funds will be available for the plant’s eventual 
decommissioning—which typically involves creating a trust fund.149 In addition, operators must 
obtain the maximum amount of liability insurance that can be purchased on the market.150  
Finally, operators must pay for waste management, typically storing it onsite. Until 2013, 
licensees made payments to the Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act in anticipation of sending spent fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes to a deep 
geological disposal site in Yucca Mountain, Nevada.151  After development of Yucca Mountain 
stalled, the D.C. Circuit ordered DOE to stop collecting these funds,152 but operators are 
nevertheless responsible for the costs of managing spent fuel onsite during operation as well as 
after decommissioning.153     
The process imposes still other costs on applicants and licensees that are not apparent 
from the outset.  First, as plants age and licenses are renewed, replacement parts and upgrades 
will be needed. Second, during the lifetime of a license, NRC retains authority to modify or 
revoke the license if necessary to ensure adequate protection.154 Moreover, NRC may not 
                                                                                                                                                       
Theoretically Justified?, 8 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 16 (1984) (suggesting regulated firms under-invest in 
capital compared to unregulated firms). 
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2232. 
145 A prospective licensee may choose one of two procedural paths for obtaining the necessary licenses.  The 
traditional path is set forth in 10 C.F.R. pt. 50; the newer path is set forth at id. pt. 52.  See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra 
note 37, at ch. 7; see also Nuclear Info. Resource Serv. v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) 
(upholding part 52 licensing scheme). 
146 See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (listing types of actions requiring EIS under NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations). 
147 See Balt. Gas, 462 U.S. at 101 (noting “administrative efficiency and consistency of decision” are benefits of 
such generic rules). 
148 On the history of the financial qualifications requirement, see Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue 
in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1760-63 (2011); see also Coal. for the Env’t v. NRC, 795 F.2d 
168, 170-73 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (detailing agency and court actions over time). 
149 10 C.F.R. § 50.75; see Pennington v. ZionSolutions LLC, 742 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2014) (detailing 
regulatory scheme). 
150 See The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012).  If a nuclear accident 
occurs, this primary insurance provides the cap on nuclear power plant liability; taxpayers bear any excess.  Id. § 
2210(4)(A).  The Act creates a fund that is administered by modifying the traditional the civil justice system in the 
event of an accident.  See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding Price-
Anderson Act against constitutional challenges). 
151 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10101-10270 (2012). 
152 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
153 For an overview of these costs, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-15-141, SPENT NUCLEAR 
FUEL MANAGEMENT:  OUTREACH NEEDED TO HELP GAIN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FEDERAL ACTIVITIES THAT 
ADDRESS LIABILITY app. V (Oct. 2014) (showing capital costs in tens of millions and annual operating costs at 
$100,000 to $300,000 for operating sites and $2.5 million to $6.5 million at shutdown reactor sites). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a); see Carstens v NRC, 742 F.2d 1546, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasizing standard does not 
require zero risk); see also Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting “complete,” “entire,” or 
“perfect” assurance of safety). 
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consider costs when determining what constitutes adequate protection.155  Thus, NRC may 
unilaterally modify or add to existing licensed facilities’ requirements (known as 
“backfitting”)156 in order to assure adequate protection without a cost-benefit analysis.157  Thus, 
even after licenses are granted and operators have internalized the costs described above, 
operators remain open to costly, unpredictable modification requirements for the lifetime of their 
licenses.158  For example, following Fukushima, NRC considered a potential backfit modification 
estimated by the agency to require $15 - 30 million per reactor unit; industry argued the cost 
would be as much as twice that.159   The possibility of added costs introduces an important 
element of risk into nuclear investments. 
 When one considers the many costs associated with siting, constructing, operating, and 
decommissioning a nuclear power plant, one can see why the levelized costs for nuclear are so 
high.160  Simply stated, nuclear regulation requires owners of nuclear power plants to internalize 
more of their externalities than other sources of generation.  Waste products provide an example.  
Coal’s CCRs contain a variety of heavy metals but are not regulated as hazardous wastes under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).161  As explained in Part I, CCRs are 
generated at a pace of more than 100 million tons per year, and poor disposal practices have 
caused several catastrophic incidents.162 Spent nuclear fuel, on the other hand, must be contained 
in extraordinarily robust fuel pools or dry casks that are regulated under the same defense-in-
depth principles underlying nuclear generation facilities themselves; this approach has an 
extremely impressive safety record.163  And as described above, for years operators have also 
paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund for ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
                                                
155 See Union of Concerned Scis. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In setting 
or enforcing the standard of “adequate protection” that this section requires, the Commission may not consider the 
economic costs of safety measures.”). 
156 50 C.F.R. § 50.109. 
157 If NRC determines that a particular course of action will lead to substantial enhancements beyond adequate 
protection, however, it will engage in a cost-benefit analysis. Union of Concerned Scis. v. NRC (Concerned 
Scientists II), 880 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding two-pronged approach to backfitting).  NRC issued several 
backfit orders in response to lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster.  E.g., Order Modifying Licenses With 
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, NRC EA-12-049 (Mar. 
12, 2012) (making adequate protection finding); see also NRC, Modified Hardened Venting Order, NRC EA-13-109 
(June 6, 2013) (making substantial enhancements finding).  See generally Emily Hammond, Nuclear Power, Risk, 
and Retroactivity, -- VAND. J.  TRANSNAT’L L. – (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with authors) (evaluating 
NRC response to Fukushima and implications of backfitting rules). 
158 This possibility was a source of concern early in the AEA’s history.  See Dunlavey, supra note 140, at 331 
(“Most of these powers over the licensee provide no compensation to him for interrupting his business.”).   
159 GAO, GAO-15-98, NRC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS COST ESTIMATES BY INCORPORATING MORE BEST PRACTICES 3 
(Dec. 2014).  After industry complaints, GAO was asked to investigate and report on NRC’s cost estimate methods 
generally, and this particular estimate specifically.  GAO concluded that the cost estimate “is not reliable because it 
did not fully or substantially meet any of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.”  Id. at 15. 
160 See supra Part I.C.1. (presenting LCOE estimates). 
161 Instead, EPA has chosen the lighter-handed regulation it reserves for solid (non-hazardous) wastes.  See Final 
Rule, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric 
Utilities, -- Fed. Reg. -- (December 19, 2014). 
162 See supra Part I.C.1. (describing CCRs). 
163 See Final Rule, Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (finding 
reasonable assurances of safety of long-term spent fuel storage); id. at 56,247 (presenting table showing no 
noticeable predicted environmental impacts associated with short- or long-term storage, in nearly every category 
considered); see, e.g., Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel app. E, 
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 Decommissioning provides another example.  Nuclear power operators must uniformly 
pay in advance for decommissioning costs that may occur more than sixty years in the future.164  
By contrast, the experience of fossil-fueled and renewable power varies by state.  In some states, 
generators seek permission to recover costs of decommissioning only once the decision to close a 
plant has been made.165  Others require that bonds be posted at some date near the expected life 
of the project; for example, the Oklahoma Wind Energy Development Act requires owners of 
wind energy facilities to provide evidence of financial security to cover decommissioning costs 
after the fifteenth year of operation.166  In these and other ways, nuclear power internalizes costs 
that other sources of generation frequently do not.   
 
B. The Nuclear Power Risk Premium 
 
We hypothesize that nuclear power’s price tag is higher than would be economically 
efficient because it includes what we refer to as a “nuclear risk premium.”167  Economists have 
provided estimates of the increased costs facing new nuclear construction stemming from 
uncertainty about the regulatory landscape, construction timetables, and future prices of 
competing energy fuels like natural gas. 168   In addition, risk perception operates as an 
explanatory variable for understanding not only those increased costs, but also the robust 
licensing scheme described above.  Scholars have documented that risk perception mechanisms 
can lead to inefficient levels of regulation.169  This sort of inefficiency is present in the nuclear 
power regime, further undermining its cost competitiveness in the wholesale market.     
   First, we note that risk theory incorporates three distinct concepts: assessment, 
perception, and mitigation.  Risk assessment—sometimes called engineering risk—is a 
methodology leading to an understanding of the probability that a hazard will manifest and the 
magnitude of the expected harm.170  NRC uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to evaluate 
                                                                                                                                                       
at E-24 (Sept. 2014) (presenting seven known incidents of spent fuel pool leaks and noting no releases have affected 
health of public).  
164 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
165 E.g., In the Matter of the application of Consumers Energy Co. for a Financing Order Approving the 
Securitization of Qualified Costs, Case No. U-17473 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Sept. 9, 2013) (seeking authority to 
issue bonds to pay for decommissioning of three coal-fired power plants); id. Op’n & Order (Dec. 6, 2013) (granting 
in part and denying in part). 
166 See Oklahoma Wind Energy Development Act of 2011, 17 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 160.14 (2012) (requiring 
decommissioning); id. § 160.15 (evidence of financial security may be in form of bond, parent guaranty, or letter of 
credit).  But see Paul Monies, Oklahoma Corporation Commission ends wind inquiry, calls for rules on 
decommissioning of turbines, THE OKLAHOMAN (Dec. 2, 2014) (stating no rules have been promulgated under 
decommissioning provisions of statute; none of state’s wind farms has yet sought decommissioning). 
167 As used in economic assessments of nuclear power, the “nuclear risk premium” refers to the cost of uncertainty 
and relates to investor reluctance to invest in more nuclear power given regulatory, construction, and fuel mix 
uncertainties.  See MIT STUDY (2009 Update), supra note 71, at 8.  Our usage is slightly different in that it 
incorporates risk perception as an additional explanatory variable.    
168 Id. 
169 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR:  BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 69 (2005) (“regulators may end up 
engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intensive emotional reactions are making people relatively 
insensitive to the (low) probably that dangers will ever come to fruition”); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 3-29 (1993) (arguing various defects lead to irrational 
regulation).  
170 See Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK ANALYSIS 11, 11-27 
(1981) (setting forth quantitative definition of risk); Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, Risk Uncertainty and Analysis in 
Government Safety Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633, 635-36 (2002) (providing examples of probabilistic risk 
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risks associated with nuclear reactors.171  For example, its first study of this nature was issued in 
1975 and considered accident risks based on the frequency of initiating events and their expected 
consequences.172  Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, NRC began developing and 
applying increasingly rigorous methods of risk assessment and explicitly committed to 
quantitative risk assessment methods.173  The NRC’s part 52 licensing procedures require 
applicants for design certifications and combined licenses to perform a PRA and provide 
supporting analyses.174   
Risk mitigation—reducing the magnitude or likelihood of an anticipated hazard—is a 
fundamental goal of the licensing regime. 175  NRC’s risk mitigation philosophy is captured in 
the term “defense-in-depth,” a notion that encompasses redundancy and contingency planning176 
and implies multiple layers of preventative, mitigation, and emergency preparedness 
measures.177  More specifically, nuclear reactors are designed and constructed using assumptions 
about the types of hazards that must be mitigated. This analysis uses the concepts of “design-
basis events” and “beyond-design-basis events.”178  The design-basis concept requires facilities 
to be designed with safety systems in place to address both anticipated operational events, and 
accidents.179  For example, seismic risks and flooding are two hazards contemplated by the 
design basis. 180  Second, beyond-design-basis events are informally equated with safety 
enhancements, that is, requirements beyond adequate protection that would be mandated only if 
their benefits outweighed their costs.181  As new information is gleaned, NRC can use backfit 
                                                                                                                                                       
analysis).  Notwithstanding the quantitative engineering methodologies that underlie risk assessment, the verbal 
formulation described above it familiar to legal jurisprudence, as demonstrated most famously by the Hand Formula.  
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
171 See NRC FACT SHEET, PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (Oct. 2007) (explaining that PRA seeks to quantify 
discrete risks as well as how those risks interact in a complex system).   
172 NRC, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY:  AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS, WASH-1400 (Oct. 1975). 
173 See NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND:  A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND TO THE PUBLIC, NUREG/CR-1250 
(1980) (“the Rogovin Report”). 
174 E.g., 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.47(23); 52.79(48)). 
175 This discussion focuses on the design and construction aspects of mitigating nuclear safety risks.  However, these 
technological risk mitigation techniques are only part of the range of risk mitigation approaches relevant to this 
sector.  Insurance, for example, is also considered a risk mitigation measure.  See Hank Jenkins-Smith & Howard 
Kunreuther, Mitigation and Benefits Measures as Policy Tools for Siting Potentially Hazardous Facilities:  
Determinants of Effectiveness and Appropriateness, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 2 (2001) (providing additional examples); 
Paul Kleindorfer & Howard Kunreuther, The Complimentary Roles of Mitigation and Insurance in Managing 
Catastrophic Risks, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 727 (1999) (discussing cushions and insurance).  
176  NRC, MITIGATION OF BEYOND-DESIGN BASIS EVENTS 3, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-
experience/japan-dashboard/emergency-procedures.html (collecting sources) (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
177 Id. at 25. But as the NRC’s post-Fukushima Near-Term Task Force for Lessons Learned (NTTF) determined, the 
defense-in-depth and PRA approach are not efficiently combined in NRC’s regulatory scheme.  See NRC, NEAR-
TERM TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  THE NEAR-
TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 21 (July 12, 2001) [hereinafter 
NTTF Report]. Indeed, a major component of the NTTF’s recommendations was to completely overhaul the 
regulatory framework, to combine risk assessment and defense-in-depth “more formally.” Id.; see also id. at 22 
(“The Task Force recommends establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate 
protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.”). 
178 Id. at 15.   
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id.  
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orders to require risk mitigation updates, prompting the regulatory uncertainty described 
above.182     
The final component of risk theory—risk perception—is our focus here.  Risk perception 
deals with the many mechanisms by which the human brain perceives, understands, predicts, and 
responds to risk.  Risk theory suggests a strong likelihood that perception imposes costs on 
nuclear power disproportionately in relation to other electricity fuel sources.  One of the most 
straightforward ways to understand this disproportionality is by reference to research developing 
the “psychometric paradigm.”183  The psychometric paradigm uses statistical techniques to 
organize risk perceptions according to two variables.184  The first is the extent to which a risk is 
dreaded—that is, “catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to future 
generations, not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary and [personally] threatening.”185  The 
second variable relates to the familiarity of a risk—that is, its “observability, knowledge, 
immediacy of consequences and familiarity.”186  Nuclear technology—power, waste disposal, 
and uranium mining—features prominently among the high-dread, low-familiarity risks.187  By 
contrast, examples of low-dread, high-familiarity risks are bicycles, shock from electric 
appliances, recreational boating, chainsaws, and trampolines.188   
The higher a risk scores on the “dread” axis, the more people tend to want strict 
regulation in hopes of reducing the risk.189  And indeed, the nuclear licensing scheme is one of 
the strictest in the United States,190 both in terms of the substantive requirements for adequate 
protection, and in terms of the procedural requirements associated with obtaining licenses.  The 
                                                
182 E.g., Hammond supra note 157 (describing rulemaking and backfitting orders following Fukushima); NTTF 
Report, supra note 177, at 16 (describing backfitting following September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); id. (describing 
backfitting following TMI accident).  
183 Note that a variety of risk perception mechanisms provide insights into nuclear power; we highlight the 
psychometric paradigm for its demonstrative usefulness.  One of the most important alternative accounts for risk 
perception generally is cultural cognition theory (CCT), which attempts to account for variations among individuals 
by grouping them into cultural worldviews.  For example, France is far more accepting of nuclear power than the 
United States. Paul Slovic et al., Nuclear Power and the Public:  A Comparative Study of Risk Perceptions in 
France and the United States, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 55 (2000).  
The French, however, are more likely to hold hierarchical worldviews than individualistic Americans.  Id. at 51.  
Thus, they are both more accepting of the risks associated with nuclear power, and more comfortable with the ability 
of elite experts to manage those risks.  Id. at 87-90, 93-94, 98; see also MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, 
RISK AND CULTURE:  AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) 
(presenting early work on cultural theory). Other risk perception mechanisms relevant to low-probability, high-
consequence risks like nuclear power are collected in SUNSTEIN, supra note 169 (describing the availability 
heuristic, probability neglect, loss aversion, system neglect, and affect, among others).   
184 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281 (1987). 
185 Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears:  Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  HOW SAFE 
IS ENOUGH? 141 (1980). 
186 Id. 
187 Slovic, supra note 184 at 236.  
188 Id.   
189 Id. at 283. 
190 Similarly strict and detailed schemes are targeted at other dread risks, such as chemical weapons incineration.  
See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 316 (1993); Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1487-89 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing Army’s implementing process); Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision, 53 Fed. Reg. 5816 (Feb. 26, 1988) (Army’s 
environmental impact statement for incineration).  See also Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 
348(f) (unsafe food additives); id. § 355(c)(1)(b) (new drugs) (2000) (both discussing formal hearing procedures). 
Draft – April 8, 2015 – please do not cite without permission 
29 
 
substantive requirements are addressed above, but the procedural requirements are worth 
emphasizing as well.  To illustrate the point, consider the famous administrative-law decision, 
Vermont Yankee,191 which was borne of public opposition to nuclear power and the D.C. 
Circuit’s concern that agencies were not taking seriously the public protection mandates of their 
organic statutes.192  Imposing stricter procedures on agencies was viewed by some as an 
appropriate way for courts to police what they perceived to be inadequate risk regulation.193  
Vermont Yankee clamped down on courts’ use of this method,194 but those who oppose nuclear 
power (and other dread risks) are motivated to persistently seek more formalized procedures, 
which generally take more time than less formal approaches, notwithstanding that the existing 
procedures are already highly formalized and costly.195 
In addition to attracting substantively and procedurally complex regulatory schemes, 
dread risks are also particularly susceptible to “punctuating events,” that is, spectacular, high-
profile, low-probability events that are processed by the brain as representative of the risks posed 
by a technology generally.196  After Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, no new nuclear reactors 
were constructed in the United States for over thirty years, and worldwide construction likewise 
declined sharply.  The safety questions and backfitting orders raised by these events, moreover, 
contributed to the notorious construction delays for plants in progress.  And finally, public 
opposition to nuclear power grew significantly, contributing to regulatory delays and a lack of 
political support for the technology.  To be clear, we note that punctuating events can highlight 
needed and appropriate changes.197  But they can also prompt knee-jerk responses from elected 
officials, regulators, and the public that contribute to overregulation and regulatory 
uncertainty.198  With longstanding and strong opposition finding fresh motivation with each 
                                                
191 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
192 This history is recounted in Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial 
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 758-59 (2011) [hereinafter Hammond, Super 
Deference]. 
193 This use of procedure dates at least to the origins of the APA.  See Martin Shapiro, APA:  Past, Present, & 
Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 89, 98 
(1996) (adoption of the APA “signaled that broad delegations of power and combined functions would be tolerated 
as long as they were checked by more extensive procedures.”). see also McNollgast, The Political Origins of the 
APA, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 181 (1999) (“By reducing administrative discretion, formal procedures create 
transaction costs that incrase the time and resources needed to change policy.”). 
194 But see Jack Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 858-59 
(2007) (collecting literature arguing courts continue to impose unwarranted obligations on agencies). 
195 See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 391 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing history). Other 
features of regulatory design, such as redundancy and complexity, likely also relate to risk perceptions, but a full 
account is beyond the scope of this paper.  See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 
224 (2011) (“bureaucratic redundancies are most often worthwhile when the redundant agency provides a significant 
benefit by safeguarding against high-magnitude harm.”). 
196 For an overview of such issues, see generally RISK, MEDIA AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES 
TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2001). See also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 283 (1987) 
(describing enormous costs TMI imposed on society in terms of stricter regulation and increased opposition to 
nuclear power, despite that it caused relatively little actual harm).   
197 Sea-Coast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1982) (describing how Three Mile Island 
illustrated need for emergency planning for areas around nuclear power plants); see generally NTTF Report, supra 
note 177 (describing recommendations in response to Fukushima). 
198 SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 206; Slovic, supra note 196, at 283-84. 
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punctuating event, agency and industry plans in these areas tend to encounter “extensive delay 
and escalating costs that have been widely regarded as attributable to public opposition.”199    
This form of cost uncertainty is extraordinarily difficult to quantify,200 but it is certainly 
present for nuclear power.  Of course, perceived risks do encompass some actual risks, which 
ought to be and are mitigated by the robust licensing scheme described above.  In addition, some 
of the byproducts of dread serve other functions.  Heightened agency procedures, for example, 
are a response to actual public concern, and in that way serve important ideals that are at the core 
of government legitimacy.201  What this discussion of risk perception illustrates, however, is that 
because nuclear power has unique risk attributes, it bears costs that other fuel sources do not 
bear.  To some extent, this means that nuclear power most fully internalizes its costs.  But it is 
also means that the role of risk perception cannot be ignored in considering how different 
electricity fuel sources and markets interact. 
 
C. A Dynamic Account of the Nuclear Risk Premium 
 
From the preceding discussion it is starting to become apparent how nuclear power went 
from “too cheap to meter” to uncompetitive on today’s wholesale markets.202  Nuclear power 
plants in operation today were constructed on the assumption that electricity demand would 
skyrocket,203 during a period when natural gas-fueled electricity generation was banned due to 
shortages,204 oil prices were escalating, and national security was a prominent concern.205  The 
traditional regulatory contract, complete with rate recovery of costs plus a fair return, was the 
norm.  And it appeared both that large amounts of capacity would be needed to meet projected 
demands, and that coal and nuclear generation were so cost-superior to oil and natural gas 
                                                
199  Judith Bradbury & Steve Rayner, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT AND PARTICIPATORY 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 15, 22 (Hussein Abaza & Andrea Baransini, eds., 2002).  
200 For a study measuring risk perception’s impact on home values near nuclear shipping routes, see Kishore 
Gawande & Hank Jenkins-Smith, Nuclear Waste Transport and Residential Property Values:  Estimating the Effects 
of Perceived Risks, 42 J. ENVTL. & ECON. MGMT. 207 (2001). Cf. Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992) 
(in takings case, permitting additional compensation for lost value associated with perceived risk of property located 
on nuclear waste shipping route). 
201 Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:  Building Legitimacy from the 
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 320-26 (2013) (mapping administrative law onto procedural justice 
norms).  
202 Of course, nuclear power was never actually “too cheap to meter.”  Some commentators have argued that the 
phrase itself was essentially propaganda, lacking endorsement even from nuclear supporters.  See VACLAV SMIL, 
ENERGY MYTHS AND REALITIES:  BRINGING SCIENCE TO THE ENERGY POLICY DEBATE at 31-32 (2010) (attributing 
“too cheap to meter” to 1954 speech by AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss to National Association of Science 
Writers, and suggesting Strauss may have been referring to fusion); id. at 32 (describing 1955 journal entry of David 
E. Lilienthal, stating nuclear development “is characterized more by salesmanship, propaganda, and overzealousness 
than sense.”). 
203 Expectations were for more than a 7% increase annually.  EIA, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS:  CAUSES, 
COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 7 (1983).   
204 Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978), repealed, Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1021, 95 Stat. 614 (1981). 
205 DOE, REDUCING U.S. OIL VULNERABILITY, ENERGY POLICIES FOR THE 1980’S 10-11 (1980).  For an overview of 
the forecasts in the 1970s, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:  Canceled 
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 497, 500-02 (1984). 
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generation that the latter two generation sources should be retired.206  In other words, nuclear 
power appeared to be the best option for consumers.   
Yet the projections that spurred significant investments in nuclear power failed to come 
to fruition.  Demand did not increase as expected, deregulation of natural gas led to dramatically 
reduced prices, and the oil market did not behave as forecast.207  Nuclear power plants turned out 
to be relatively expensive investments.  Further, these developments coincided with the TMI 
accident as well as the Chernobyl disaster, which contributed to negative perceptions and 
prompted additional regulatory action.208  Ultimately, nuclear construction costs ran as much as 
ten times what had been predicted, the timeframe for completion stretched to an average of 
twelve years, and utilities began canceling partially completed plants.209  There is some debate 
about the reasons for the significant disparities between projected and actual historical costs.210  
Most accounts, however, cite regulatory delays, redesign requirements, and poor construction 
management and quality control. 211 Ultimately, utilities encountered great difficulties when they 
found that they could not necessarily recover from their ratepayers (a) the full costs of completed 
plants;212 or (b) the costs of canceled plants.213 
 Consider, for example, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,214 which involved the issue of 
rate recovery for the costs associated with canceled nuclear plants.  There, the Supreme Court 
upheld a state statute requiring rates to be set without consideration of expenditures for plants 
that were planned but never built.215  The story was typical:  several utilities planned to construct 
seven nuclear power plants, but determined after the Arab oil embargo and TMI that the plants 
should be cancelled.216  One utility’s share of preliminary construction costs exceeded $35 
million, and it sought permission from the state PUC to recoup those costs in its rates by 
amortizing them over a ten-year period.217  Following an investigation, an administrative law 
judge determined that the expenditures, and the ultimate cancellation, were reasonable and 
prudent at the time made.218 But an intervening state statute required that construction costs 
could be included in rates only when facilities became “used and useful.”219     
Acknowledging the regulatory contract, the Court began by noting that public utilities are 
bound by a statutory duty to serve the public notwithstanding their ownership by private 
                                                
206 Pierce, supra note 205, at 502.   
207 See id. at 502-03 (describing outcome of these and other forecasts). 
208 See supra.  Notably, most construction also took place during the Cold War, when worries of nuclear annihilation 
were prominent in the minds of many citizens; it was easy to link the imagery of nuclear weapons to nuclear power 
plants.  See Dorothy Nelkin, Anti-Nuclear Connections:  Power and Weapons, 37 BULL. ATOMIC. SCIS. 36, 38-39 
(1981) (linking anti-nuclear power and anti-nuclear proliferation movements). 
209 See Pierce, supra note 205, at 504-05 (describing events and collecting sources). 
210 MIT Study, supra note 71, at 38.  Notably, European reactor construction costs also significantly exceeded 
projections.  Id. 
211 For example, the part 50 licensing process enabled contentions to be raised and re-raised at each licensing phase, 
contributing to numerous delays.  BOSEELMAN ET AL., supra note 37, ch. 7; see also MIT Study, supra note 71, at 38 
(describing reasons). 
212 See Pierce, supra note 205, at 511-17 (describing state regulatory treatment of completed plants). 
213 Id. at 517-20 (describing state regulatory treatment of canceled plants). 
214 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
215 Id. at 302. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. at 303. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 303-05. 
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investors.220  The Court recognized that the rate order may not jeopardize the financial integrity 
of a company, or leave it with insufficient operating capital, or unable to raise future capital.221  
However, in this case, the denied costs represented only a small portion of the utility’s overall 
rate base, and leaving the utility with a sufficient rate of return, and the Court refused to 
intervene.222 
 Decisions like Duquesne undermined investors’ expectation that the costs involved in 
obtaining a nuclear operating license would largely be borne by ratepayers.223  Cost recovery for 
completed plants, of course, had always been subject to certain limitations—most commonly, the 
requirement that an investment be prudent or that a facility be used and useful.224  Since 
investors expected that nuclear plants would be necessary to serve growing demand, they never 
considered the possibility that a “prudent” investment might be cancelled—that is, that it might 
never become “used and useful.”     
 
1. Barriers to New Construction	  
The history of disappointed rate recovery expectations continues to dampen enthusiasm 
for new nuclear projects.225  In regulated states, investors have learned the painful lesson that 
cost recovery is not guaranteed.  And in restructured states, there are even deeper issues.  Cost 
recovery is not a feature of the landscape, and the “missing money” problem means that 
wholesale rates are unlikely to incentivize even needed new capacity.226  Asset specificity will 
further disincentivize large capital investment.227  Of the 100 reactors operating today, all had 
broken ground by 1977.228  The levelized cost estimates set forth in Part I implicitly reflect these 
concerns, which have only been exacerbated by subsequent punctuating events—most recently, 
the Fukushima disaster.229   
                                                
220 Id. at 307. 
221 Id. at 312. 
222 Id. at 311-12. 
223 Contributing to the uncertainty are examples to the contrary.  See, e.g., Pennington v. ZionSolutions LLC, 742 
F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2014) (typically decommissioning trusts are funded by charges to ratepayers); Yankee 
Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 249, 251 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (referencing ratepayers’ bearing costs of 
spent fuel storage and amounts paid to Nuclear Waste Fund); Legis. Util. Consumers’ Council v. Pub. Serv. Co., 402 
A.2d 626 (N.H. 1979) (upholding state PUC’s inclusion in rate base of construction work-in-progress to finance 
nuclear power plant construction); cf. Grand Council of Crees (of Quebec) v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (holding environmental challenge to FERC exercise of ratemaking authority outside statute’s zone of 
interests; noting environmental considerations are relevant “as the need to meet environmental requirements may 
affect the firm’s costs.”).  For a case involving new nuclear construction, see In re Georgia Power’s Application for 
the Certification of Unites 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtl and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, No. 27,800, 2010 WL 
2647607 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 17, 2010). 
224 See Pierce, supra note 205, at 511-13.  Many jurisdictions also provide some recovery during construction.  See, 
e.g., Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing FERC’s history with two 
methods: allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC); and construction work in progress (CWIP)).   
225 MIT Study, supra note 71, at 38 (“the specter of high construction costs has been a major factor leading to very 
little credible commercial interest in investments in new nuclear plants”); cf. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., WHITE 
PAPER, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PROGRESS:  AN EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL TOOL TO LOWER THE COST OF ELECTRICITY, 
at 3-4 (Feb. 2012) (describing importance of state CWIP legislation for nuclear power construction). 
226 See supra Part I.D.1. (discussing these issues). 
227 Id. 
228  EIA, NUCLEAR REACTOR OPERATIONAL STATUS TABLES, NUCLEAR REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS AND 
OPERATIONAL HISTORY Tbl. 3 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
229 See NTTF Report, supra note 177 (describing events). 
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Despite these developments, there has been some movement in new reactor construction, 
though to date new construction is limited to two traditionally regulated states230—Georgia and 
South Carolina.231  This activity is attributable to several circumstances.  First, all of the granted 
and pending license applications were filed in a period from 2007-09, when natural gas prices 
were high and the hydraulic fracturing boom had not yet taken hold.232  In addition, coal was 
increasingly under scrutiny for its GHG emissions, and Congress was considering a number of 
climate change bills that would have increased the cost of emitting GHGs.233   
Second, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) included major incentives for new 
nuclear plants that were focused on lowering the risks for first movers.234  These incentives 
included regulatory risk insurance, which authorized DOE to enter up to six contracts with 
sponsors of new nuclear power.235 Under these contracts, the government promised to pay the 
principle and interest on debt, as well as extra costs incurred for purchasing replacement power 
due to licensing delays. 236  Notably, this risk insurance covered agency delay as well as 
litigation expenses, regardless of the ultimately prevailing party.237  In this way, federal law 
aimed at least briefly at some of the risk-perception induced costs associated with nuclear 
power.238. 
EPAct 2005 also included a nuclear production tax credit for the first 6000 MW of new 
nuclear capacity for the first eight years of operation.  However, construction was required to 
begin by January 1, 2014 to meet eligibility requirements.239  Thus, only the four reactors 
currently under construction met these criteria.  Finally, EPAct 2005 authorized loan guarantees 
for clean energy projects, under which the federal government can guarantee up to eighty percent 
of a nuclear plant’s estimated costs.  To be eligible for such loans, applicants must have been 
granted a combined operating license from NRC.  Thus, few applicants are eligible, and so far 
DOE has closed on a loan only for one project—the Vogtle project in Georgia.240  For this plant, 
                                                
230 See infra Part III.B.2. (describing state initiatives). 
231 These are, respectively, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s Vogtle Units 3 and 4, and South Carolina 
Electric and Gas’s V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3.  Note that TVA has also resumed construction of its Watts Bar Unit 
2, which had been suspended in 1985.  See NRC, WATTS BAR UNIT 2 REACTIVATION, http://www.nrc.gov/info-
finder/reactor/wb/watts-bar.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  Eight applications for combined licenses are pending, 
some of which are for reactors in restructured states.  NRC, COMBINED LICENSE APPLICATIONS FOR NEW REACTORS, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last updated July 1, 2014).  The pending applications are for 
units in Maryland (restructured), Michigan (restructured), Florida, Pennsylvania (restructured), Virginia, and Texas 
(restructured).  Id.  
232 EIA, U.S. NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD PRICE (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm. 
233 See Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007, S.309, 110th Cong. (2007); American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); see MIT Study (2009 Update), supra note 71, at 6 
(emphasizing that including cost of carbon in LCOE estimates would make nuclear more competitive with both coal 
and natural gas). 
234 See MIT Study (2009 Update), supra note 71, at 8-9 (discussing “risk premium” associated with nuclear and need 
to gain proven experience if premium is to be reduced). 
235 42 U.S.C. § 16014 (2012). 
236 The regulatory risk insurance was structured so that the first two licensed reactors were covered for 100% of 
these costs (with a $500 million limit), while the next four were covered at 50% (with a $250 million limit). See 
Final Rule, Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,306 (Aug. 11, 2006). 
237 Id. at 46,308-09. 
238 See also Justin Gundlach, Note, What’s the Cost of a Nuclear Power Plant? The Answer’s Gonna Cost You:  A 
Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New Nuclear Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 643-45 (2011) 
(describing this and other initiatives). 
239 I.R.S. Bull. No. 2006-18 (May 1, 2006). 
240 See GAO, STATUS OF DOE LOAN PROGRAMS, BRIEFING TO APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 17 (Feb. 2013). 
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at least, the specter of unrecoverable cost overruns has been diminished.  Prospective new 
entrants today, however, face the same hurdles as before.  
 
2. Competing on the Markets	  
The discussion above helps explain why investors are reluctant to construct new nuclear 
plants, but it does not necessarily explain why existing plants are finding it so difficult to 
compete on the wholesale markets.  Nuclear industry groups typically explain that low natural 
gas prices and policies giving preferences to renewables are to blame.241  But what does that 
really mean? With respect to low natural gas prices, recall that low fuel costs for generators 
translate to low short-run marginal costs and low bids into the spot markets.242  This is also true 
for renewables, which have zero fuel costs once installed, and which can bid lower prices to the 
extent they also generate RECs or benefit from production tax credits.  But there is more to the 
story for nuclear power, as alluded to in Part I. 
For fossil-fueled power, more fuel must be burned to increase the energy output of a 
plant; thus, those sources’ marginal costs are closely tied to the cost of fuel and the efficiency of 
the plant.243  But nuclear power depends on fuel that is loaded every eighteen to twenty-four 
months; this happens on a regularly scheduled basis and corresponds with intense unrelated 
maintenance activity.244  Small changes in output related to grid demand do not change this 
schedule or the fuel costs; with this understanding we can say that nuclear power’s short-run 
marginal costs are zero.245  Moreover, because nuclear plants need to run continuously, they bid 
into the market as “price takers,” meaning they will take the spot price, even if that price is 
negative.246  Recall, however, that firms need operating profits to cover their fixed costs.  If, on 
average, a firm receives spot prices below its long-run average costs, the firm will not be 
profitable.  For nuclear power, those costs include a highly trained workforce, backfits, upgrades, 
insurance payments, fuel management, and final waste disposal. 247  In other words, the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, which beneficially internalizes what for other fuels are 
externalities, also contributes to higher long-run average costs compared to other fuel sources.  
When spot market prices are low, nuclear power can become unprofitable.  Indeed, several plants 
have closed for this reason,248 and many others appear to be at risk.249  
 
                                                
241  WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 2015), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/USA--Nuclear-Power/; Press Release, NEI, NEI Warns Wall Street 
Analysts of Flawed Electricity Markets (Feb. 13, 2014).   
242 See supra Part I.C.1. 
243 Id. 
244 NUCLEAR ECONOMICS CONSULTING GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER & SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST 2-3 (2014). 
245 Id.  In a regulated state, the relevant calculation would include the cost of fuel averaged over the expected plant 
output for the one-and-a-half to two-year operating period.  Id. at 2. 
246 Id. at 4. 
247 See supra Parts II.B. – C. (describing various costs). 
248 See Jennifer Levitz & Rebecca Smith, Vermont Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down as Industry Evolves, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/vermont-nuclear-power-plant-shut-down-as-industry-evolves-
1419903597 (citing “economic facts, especially related to the natural-gas market,” and collecting examples of other 
shutdowns). 
249 Julie Wernau & Alex Richards, As Exelon threatens to shut nuclear plants, Illinois town fears fallout, CHI. 
TRIBUNE, Mar. 9, 2014, http://m.nuclearpowersillinois.com/news-resources/news-articles/as-exelon-threatens-to-
shut-nuclear-plants-illinois-town-fears-fallout (describing study finding that Exelon’s Illinois reactors have not 
earned enough money to cover operating and ongoing capital expenses). 
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D. Lessons Learned	  
The experience of nuclear power makes several points concrete.  First, the regulatory 
contract, once a cornerstone of investor expectations and an assumption underpinning the nuclear 
regulatory regime, is now much more amorphous.  Cost recovery for large capital projects seems 
uncertain or open to negotiation, rather than a boilerplate term.  Second, the impact of new 
federal requirements is now felt differently in regulated states—where backfitting, for example, 
is still recoverable—as opposed to restructured states—where the same large costs cannot be 
recouped on the market.  And finally, in the wholesale markets where only short-run marginal 
costs matter, the flaws predicted by economists are manifesting themselves in the reality of 
nuclear power.  That is, the markets are blind to the costs nuclear power incurs to provide 
reliable base load and to internalize its environmental impacts.  To be sure, many would argue 
that the atomic age should come to a close.  But the stakes are high:  as nuclear power is 
increasingly priced out of the market, scientists have observed corresponding increases in air 
pollution.250  The loss of this low-carbon source of generation is also of great concern, as the 
need for GHG mitigation grows increasingly urgent.251  And over time, there is a loss of diversity 
in fuel sources, putting corresponding pressure on reliability. 
We have focused our discussion on nuclear power partly because it so clearly 
demonstrates how and why the markets fail to value important attributes for electricity.  But the 
lessons learned have important ramifications for other grid resources.  All else equal, price 
competition favors sources like coal that can shift more pollution costs to society, or sources like 
natural gas that do not face the large up-front capital costs and long construction times.  This puts 
low-emission sources like nuclear and some renewables at a relative disadvantage.  Nor are risk 
perception issues limited to nuclear power. For example, they are increasingly a motivating force 
behind significant opposition to smart meters—a key piece of technology that would enable 
dynamic pricing as well as demand response.252  These issues are also contributing to an 
increasing number of bans on hydraulic fracturing—which may impact the price of natural 
gas.253  Overall, there is much work to be done if we are to achieve an efficient, reliable, green 
grid.        
   
III. Reforming the Regulatory Contract? 
 
                                                
250 E.g., ILLINOIS COMM. COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS:  IMPACTS AND 
MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS 115 (Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Illinois Report] (predicting, in short-term, increased 
GHG emissions if nuclear power plants were retired due to need for fossil-fueled baseload); Pushker A. Kharecha & 
James E. Hansen, Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear 
Power, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4889 (2013) (modeling deaths prevented by use of nuclear power rather than coal); 
Brian Walsh, Japan Mulls Nuclear Revival Not Even 3 Years After Fukushima, TIME, Feb. 25, 2014, 
http://time.com/9684/japan-mulls-nuclear-revival-not-even-3-years-after-fukushima/ (describing increased GHG 
emissions in Japan following moratorium on nuclear power). 
251 See Suzanne Waldman, Timeline:  The IPCC’s shifting position on nuclear energy, BULL. ATOMIC SCIS. (Feb. 8, 
2015), http://thebulletin.org/timeline-ipcc%E2%80%99s-shifting-position-nuclear-energy7975 (describing 
increasing note of urgency in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports regarding need to use all 
available low-carbon fuels, including nuclear power). 
252 See Joel B. Eisen & Emily Hammond, Risk Perception and the Smart Grid (manuscript on file with authors) 
(citing examples). 
253 See David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production:  Moral Outrage v. Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 141, 155-59 (2013) (exploring behavioral dimensions of opposition to hydraulic fracturing).  
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Changes in electricity markets have exposed anachronistic features of the various 
regulatory regimes that now define the regulatory contract.  This Part considers policy options 
that may ameliorate this divergence and help electricity markets better value clean and reliable 
electricity resources.  Pursuing those policy options, however, implicates the matter of 
governance.  The parties to the regulatory contract are no longer simply states and IOUs.  
Instead, state, regional, and federal actors are players in regulatory schemes that have only 
become more complex with the emergence of competitive markets.  Thus, we take note of 
governance challenges first.254   
 
A. Governance Challenges and the New Regulatory Contract(s) 
Pursuit of the dual-visioned green and efficient grid has produced mismatches between 
rapidly evolving markets and governance institutions that cannot evolve as quickly.  As 
described in Part I, parts of the market that were once within the control of state PUCs are, in 
some states, now controlled by regional, quasi-regulatory entities—namely, RTOs and ISOs.  In 
other, more traditionally regulated states, PUCs retain control over prices and market entry.  And 
some state PUCs must work with multiple RTOs as well as traditional regulated utilities, all 
within the state borders.  Alongside this complex, multi-tiered electricity regulatory structure sits 
environmental law and its system of cooperative federalism, which continues to dominate the 
management of environmental externalities for air and water resources, largely in the same way 
as it has since the 1970s.255  With respect to climate change, however, states, local governments, 
and regional entities are taking their own initiatives to address issues left unresolved at the 
federal level.256  Overall, subnational institutions have filled the gap left by a gridlocked 
Congress.257  
But as emphasized in Part II, source-specific federal law can exert a powerful effect on 
the relative competitiveness of different fuels.258  The example of nuclear power forcefully 
demonstrates the point with its strong and comprehensive regulatory regime for power plant 
licensing.259  Indeed, this regulatory scheme provides the benefits of a nearly complete treatment 
of nuclear’s possible negative externalities, but imposes high compliance costs, some of which 
                                                
254 These challenges are not new.  See, e.g., Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory 
Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1002 (1987) (lamenting irretrievable fragmentation of regulatory authority over 
electricity).  
255 See Hammond & Markell, supra note 201, at 355-56 (discussing cooperative federalism structure and its 
influence on development of environmental policy). 
256 See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands On Deck:  Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional 
Climate Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 743-44 (2011) (demonstrating importance of local government efforts); 
cf. Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Response, Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental 
Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1429 (2008) (contending subnational efforts undermine 
effectiveness of national efforts). 
257 Nascent EPA efforts to regulate GHG emissions from power plants recognize as much.  See Clean Power Plan, 
supra note 10, at 34,833 (emphasizing state flexibility). 
258 Our focus has been electricity markets, but the experience of natural gas markets also demonstrates the point.  
See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (holding Natural Gas Act required FPC to regulate price 
of natural gas at the well head into interstate commerce); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas 
Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 53 (Summer 1995) (criticizing Phillips and tracing history of 
natural gas policy). 
259 Hydroelectric licensing is similar in that the process is centralized in a federal agency, and preempts most state 
and local regulation. California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 496 (1990); First Iowa v. Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 174 (1946). 
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may be over and above efficient levels. This regime was created in the time of a strong 
regulatory contract, when nuclear plants did not compete directly with other generation sources 
on price.  Ironically, the federal regulatory regime persists in the context of a system of market 
pricing that takes no notice of the added technical, safety, and environmental benefits that the 
current licensing provides.    
Not only does law require some generation sources to internalize more of their 
environmental externalities than others, but states have come into increasingly frequent conflict 
with regional entities, the federal government, and each other over electricity market regulation. 
For example, states in the western half of the PJM market are in a perpetual battle with those in 
the eastern portion over a variety of cost-allocation issues.260  This is true despite an overarching 
federal structure; after all, FERC itself opened the markets, specified the requirements for RTOs 
and ISOs, and retains oversight authority.261  More and more frequently, however, this federal 
structure is challenged to delineate its jurisdictional lines, both respect to electricity markets and 
environmental law.262 
This much is clear:  in electricity markets, federal law is not operating as a unified and 
unifying institution.  Rather than viewing federal law as a failed effort at policy unification and 
market design, however, we can identify ways it has enabled shifts in thinking and 
experimentation elsewhere. First, there is much untapped potential within the existing 
discretionary authority of federal agencies—a point to which we return in the next section.    
Second, federal law has left significant gaps for state- and region-level institutional innovators. 
This observation is consistent with recent federalism law scholarship263 emphasizing that states 
are more than the mere experimenters seeking a common (often national) goal in new and 
different ways.264  Rather, in an increasingly ideologically polarized polity, each state is striving 
to shape the regulatory contract in its own way.265  More than that, policy entrepreneurs may now 
look to ideologically kindred states as venues within which to pursue their policy goals.266 
                                                
260 See, e.g., Ill. Comm. Comm’n v. FERC, 756 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing competing interests and 
protracted litigation). 
261 Freeman & Spence, supra note 20, at 52-55 (providing context). 
262 See supra note 19 (collecting energy examples); United Air Reg. Util. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) 
(upholding in part, and rejecting in part, EPA GHG regulations under CAA).  Often, these conflicts divide along 
political party lines.  For example, EPA is in frequent conflict with states controlled by Republicans during 
Democratic presidencies, and states controlled by Democrats during Republican presidencies.  During the George 
W. Bush administration, states sued EPA over a variety of Clean Air Act issues.  See e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA 549 
U.S. 497 (2007) (states sought to force EPA to regulate GHG emissions); New Jersey v. EPA 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (state challenging EPA’s approach to regulating mercury emissions).  During the Obama Administration, 
states sued EPA over another set of Clean Air Act issues.  See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer Generation, L.P., 134 S. 
Ct. 1584 (2014) (states challenged EPA’s approach to regulating pollution transport); White Stallion Energy Ctr., 
LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (2014) (states challenged EPA’s approach to regulating mercury emissions); and. 
263 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014); Heather Gerkin, Dissenting by 
Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 
(2014); Christina Rodriguez, Federalism and National Consensus (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors). 
264 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
265 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 263, at 1082-83 (emphasizing states as arenas of partisan conflict, including 
conflict with federal actors, while implementing federal regulatory mandates). 
266 Id. at 1116-22 (arguing that people identify with parties, and with states based upon the dominant party or 
ideology within the state). 
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This conception is descriptively helpful because it requires that we acknowledge multiple 
arenas for policy development, recognizing that ideological conflicts shape those developments.  
There is also a normative purpose in conceiving state activity this way.  It illuminates our 
understanding of the evolution of federal law, particularly in a domain that is so long presumed 
to necessitate a unitary federal role.  Indeed, with respect to nuclear power, the concept of a 
strong role for states in developing energy policy seems completely at odds with the traditional 
account of nuclear licensing.  Nevertheless, we are seeing increasing heterogeneity among states 
in their approaches to nuclear policy in particular, and energy policy more generally.  Turning 
the traditional understanding of regulatory federalism on its head suggests ways forward for 
electricity markets to better integrate valued attributes.  Nevertheless, any evaluation of policies 
aimed at moving markets toward greener, more reliability electricity sources must acknowledge 
that electricity market governance is a far more complex, multilayered, and ideologically 
contentious enterprise than ever before. 
 
B.  Policy Options:  New Terms for the Regulatory Contract 
 
In many ways, governance challenges provide opportunities for innovation.  There are 
numerous options at the federal, regional, and state levels to try to ensure that reliability and 
environmental costs are better reflected in electricity prices. Some of these interventions attempt 
to alter the structure of the markets themselves in ways that will encourage new parties to the 
regulatory contract.  Others are directed at the terms of existing regulatory contracts, influencing 
the value of what is traded on existing markets.  None is panacea, but our aim is to bring these 
options together, relate them to our tripartite framework, and ask what insights they promote in 
the aggregate.  
In setting forth these options, we have made the deliberate choice of organizing them 
according to the level of government at which they would be implemented.  This organizational 
approach is somewhat artificial because some options rely on multi-jurisdictional cooperation, 
while others could be implemented without regard to jurisdiction.  But we believe this 
organization is preferable to an approach that would use the broad categories of market-based 
and regulatory options for two reasons.  First, the distinction is not so neat; market-based 
approaches require a regulatory framework.267  Second, fundamental to policy comparisons are 
choices of institutional design; we prefer to make the benefits and drawbacks of such choices 
explicit.   
 
1. Federal Initiatives 
 
Beyond existing tax credits, subsidies, and environmental controls for specific generation 
sources, what more could the federal government do to better integrate reliability and social costs 
into electricity markets?  As we have seen, the United States is faced with significant mismatches 
between valuable electricity attributes and the operation of the markets.  A large part of this 
mismatch comes from the failure of federal law to keep up with rapid changes; another 
contributor is the piecemeal and asymmetric approach to electricity generation fuels. 268   
                                                
267 See generally Hogan, supra note 49. 
268 See generally BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 37 (describing different federal regulatory regimes for hydro, coal, 
natural gas, nuclear, and renewables). 
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Scholars and policymakers have proposed numerous statutory solutions, 269  but ongoing 
congressional gridlock270 implies that we ought to be skeptical about policy initiatives that 
require legislative action.  
We conclude, as others have,271 that finding room to act within federal agencies’ 
discretionary authority is a more promising approach.  Agencies do experience successes in this 
regard, notwithstanding the constant political pressures under which they too must operate.272  
FERC, for example, has utilized its remedial authority under the Federal Power Act to bring 
about significant changes furthering renewables penetration and the opening of the markets.273  
EPA, as well, has effectuated significant change in the regulatory environment under its CAA 
authority.274  And beyond these high-profile examples, agencies can make significant policy 
headway in their more interstitial, day-to-day decisionmaking.275 
Admittedly, agencies have many masters.  The executive, courts, legislative oversight, 
and stakeholders exert considerable pressure on agencies to implement particular policy 
objectives. But their ability to pursue such objectives notwithstanding congressional gridlock 
means that policy options at the federal agency level cannot be ignored.  We outline some of the 
possibilities here, considering both changes to the market itself, and changes to what is sold on 
the markets. 
First, as already noted, FERC has significant authority in its role as designer and 
regulator of the wholesale markets.  It has used its authority to create those markets in the first 
place,276 and it has played a role in the greening of the grid by easing access for renewables.277  
Thus, some have argued that FERC has the authority to impose a carbon adder on wholesale 
sales of electricity—and ought to exercise it.278  On the other hand, FERC has been reluctant to 
                                                
269 E.g., BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY vii (Jan. 
2012) (listing numerous recommendations, including new statute and new agency for managing spent nuclear fuel); 
SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX:  GETTING PAST OUR HAND-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CARBON POLICY 
(2011) (arguing for carbon tax); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing amendments to Administrative Procedure Act); Lincoln L. 
Davies, Power Forward:  The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010) (arguing for national 
RPS). 
270 See Freeman and Spence, supra note 20, at 82-93 (explaining why gridlock is likely to continue). 
271 Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 50-54 (2013); 
supra note Freeman & Spence, supra note 20, at 80-81; Hammond & Markell, supra note 201, at 316. 
272 See Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 116, at 1782-85 (describing political climate leading to Yucca 
Mountain stall).  
273 E.g., Final Rule, Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482 (July 13, 2012); Order 1000, 
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 
49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000]; Order 888, supra note 4.     
274 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 16, at 28-42 (describing these initiatives). 
275 Hammond & Markell, supra note 201, at 315-16. 
276 E.g., Order 888, supra note 4 (mandating open access to grid). 
277 Order 1000, supra note 273 (mandating transmission planning and standardized cost allocation). FERC, however, 
was careful to clarify that its purpose was not to favor renewables; it stated “[b]ecause we are not mandating the 
consideration of any particular transmission need driven by a Public Policy Requirement, we disagree with 
[commenters’ that we are favoring renewable energy resources over other types of resources.” Order 1000, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 49,877.  Nevertheless, most observers seem to agree that the effect of Order 1000 was greater renewables 
integration.  E.g., Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power 
Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 307 (2014).  
278 Steven Weismann & Romany Webb, Addressing Climate Change Without Legislation:  How the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Can Use Its Existing Legal Authority to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Increase 
Clean Energy Use, BERKELEY ENERGY & CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2013), available at 
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directly impose environmental considerations on the markets, and there is some question whether 
the scope of its authority extends so far.279  Reading FERC’s authority to ensure rates are “just 
and reasonable” against the historical understanding of the regulatory contract seems to limit its 
jurisdiction to matters related to economic interests relating to the consumers and investors.280  
But if the regulatory contract is better conceived as a legal and institutional arrangement 
contextualized by policy goals, perhaps there is room for argument favoring carbon adders.  
As our framework in Part I suggests, however, externalities are not the only attribute of 
electricity that matters.  Reliability and flexibility are important both for maintaining reasonable 
rates and for the technical operation of the grid.  Furthermore, FERC’s authority to ensure 
reliability, at least, is far more easily settled than its ability to directly consider environmental 
factors.  Thus, a reliability and/or flexibility adder might have better traction, both as a 
jurisdictional and as a political matter.281  Certainly, deciding the price of reliability would be a 
complex task.282  But the possibility of directly accounting for this attribute—beyond the indirect 
approach of SCED—should be considered given its importance to the grid. 
There is some appeal to approaches that set overarching rules of the game rather than 
singling out a particular source of generation.  But it is clear that broad-based changes will still 
result in perceived winners and losers.  To the extent that such changes make the markets operate 
more efficiently, we should be indifferent to disparate impacts on particular fuel sources, but 
politics do not operate in such an idealized world.  EPA’s Clean Power Plan, for example, is 
meant to apply broadly, but it has generated staggering opposition from many different groups 
that perceive a disadvantage.283  An alternative (or perhaps complimentary) approach is to 
reexamine the licensing schemes for power sources that are licensed at the federal level.  Here 
we return to the nuclear example.284     
 First, we note a counter-intuitive ramification of strongly preemptive and expansive 
federal regulatory schemes:  consistent with the emerging federalism literature, such schemes 
leave room for state innovation on second-order matters.285  In the nuclear context, this means 
                                                                                                                                                       
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ccelp/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf.   Briefly summarized, the argument is that 
environmental externalities permit GHG emitters to charge lower prices than they otherwise would, making the 
markets inconsistent with the just and reasonable mandate and triggering FERC’s remedial power under FPA § 205.  
Id. at 5. 
279 See Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting, on zone-of-
interest standing grounds, tribe’s argument that FERC should have considered environmental impacts as part of 
just0-and-reasonable rate inquiry).  FERC itself has taken this position.  See 18 C.F.R. § 380.4 (categorical exclusion 
of rate filings from NEPA).  FERC does have power to approve rates that take into account state environmental 
considerations.  See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 141 FERC 61,237, at 29 (2012) (permitting tariff revisions to 
account for California’s carbon cap-and-trade program); Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 133 FERC 61,059 (2010) 
(permitting state rates to account for full avoided cost including environmental consideration); Jim Rossi & Tim 
Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1310 (2013) (arguing FERC need not 
treat PURPA’s avoided cost mandate as imposing a ceiling on state incentive rates). 
280 See Grand Council of the Crees, 198 F.3d at 956. 
281 See John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 35 ENERGY L.J. 345, 372 (2014) 
(“any remedies should focus, as much as practicable, on protecting the market, not individual competitors”). 
282 Cf. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 237-39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, J., dissenting) 
(explaining FERC’s approach to valuing DR). 
283 E.g., Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1151 (D.C. Cir. filed June 2014) (coal company challenge to EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan). 
284 We focus here on nuclear, but note that hydro is also licensed at the federal level. California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 
490, 496 (1990). 
285 See supra note 263 (collecting sources). 
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that states have incorporated innovations in rate structures, licensing, and construction oversight 
designed to balance the need to provide clean, reliable electricity with the mandate of just and 
reasonable rates.286  The details of these innovations are presented below; the important point for 
now is that this experience suggests the potential viability of new federal approaches to nuclear 
power plant licensing that might decrease the nuclear risk premium while still prioritizing safety. 
There is currently significant duplication in federal and state licensing schemes.  For 
example, states often require status reports and updates, including safety information, just as 
NRC does.287  Inefficient regulation imposes costs, and prospective new entrants are particularly 
disadvantaged with regard to licensing new plants and innovative reactor designs. Ultimately, 
perhaps a regulatory scheme of shared authority would be more effective—though this would 
admittedly require legislative intervention.288  Even if limited authority were not extended to 
states, overhauling the federal regulatory scheme is an important option—and not one dependent 
on congressional action.  As noted in Part II, NRC made major changes to its licensing scheme in 
the 1980s as part of its own efforts to reduce the risk premium.289 The new experience gained 
under the current regulations should be put to work in updating those regulations as necessary.290   
Others have noted the need for a different kind of licensing scheme for new nuclear 
technologies like small modular reactors (SMRs), which cannot hope for economic viability if 
they must proceed under the traditional licensing scheme.291  NRC itself is studying the problem 
and should make such changes a priority.292  Relevant to both attracting new entrants and 
retaining the existing nuclear fleet, NRC’s Near-Term Task Force, which reported on lessons 
learned from Fukushima, has also recommended revamping NRC’s safety regulations to better 
marry the defense-in-depth concept to probabilistic risk assessment.293  And of course, the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act has stalled perhaps past the point of any return; numerous 
recommendations for a new approach are on the table, including an NRC rule issued in 2014.294   
Notwithstanding NRC’s authority to make regulatory changes, it cannot be 
overemphasized that doing so would prompt significant backlash from groups opposed to nuclear 
                                                
286 Note that although states may not reject nuclear power plants on safety grounds, they do have power, creatively 
exercised, to make or break nuclear within their borders.  Compare Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (holding AEA did not preempt California moratorium on 
nuclear power; moratorium related to economic implications of nuclear waste), with Entergy Nuclear Vermont 
Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding AEA preempted various portions of Vermont 
statutes aimed at shuttering nuclear power plant).  But see generally James W. Moeller, State Regulation of Nuclear 
Power and National Energy Policy, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (1992) (arguing for stronger 
federal preemptive role).  
287 See infra Part III.B.2.  
288 See NRC, Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,612, 60,613 (Oct. 14, 
2008) (rejecting, on statutory mandate grounds, commenter suggestion for pilot licensing scheme whereby private 
bureaus would review SMR applications). 
289 Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 391 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing shift from part 50 to part 
52 licensing scheme). 
290 Moreover, more research is needed to align the insights of behavioral psychology to effective regulatory 
approaches designed to enhance the efficiency of regulation.  Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 169. 
291 See Peter Taberner, Licensing process to catapult US-SMR export potential, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSIDER (Jan. 28, 
2015) (noting need for licensing process evolution). 
292 73 Fed. Reg. at 60,613 (describing initial efforts to address safety and licensing issues related to advanced 
reactors like SMRs); BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 269, at vii (listing recommendations). 
293 NTTF Report, supra note 177, at 15-25. 
294 Final Rule, Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (finding reasonable 
assurances of safety of long-term spent fuel storage);   
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power.  As explained in Part II, risk theory may hold explanatory force for the desire to regulate 
nuclear power as strictly as possible.295  The courts’ response to such initiatives, moreover, may 
be difficult to predict.296  Congress and the President would likely get involved, though specific 
outcomes may depend on political parties. The inevitability of such hurdles, however, is a feature 
of the landscape for any NRC initiatives. Thus, we discount their impact somewhat.  Public 
choice theory, after all, also predicts that NRC might have an interest in reducing the nuclear risk 
premium; the agency stands to lose importance over time if the number of nuclear reactors 
dwindles.297  
 
2. State Initiatives  
 
Where traditional rate regulation and vertically integrated utilities continue to 
predominate (mainly the southeastern United States), states can exert more direct and effective 
control over market prices and investment decisions.  For example, some states provide a 
gatekeeping function to market entry through the process of IRP.298  IRP, which sometimes 
attempts to incorporate projected environmental impacts into electric generating capacity 
planning decisions, is conducted in some form in at least twenty-seven states.299  State IRP 
processes pursue this objective in at least two ways:  first, by forcing utilities to consider 
demand-side resources (energy efficiency and conservation) in making decisions about how best 
to meet projected future electric energy needs; and second, by requiring planners to consider the 
environmental costs new generating plants will produce.300  A minority of states also articulate a 
goal of maintaining fuel diversity in capacity planning decisions.301  In addition to trying to value 
fuel diversity, several states employ “adders” to the estimated costs of power for new plants 
representing the cost of externalities generated by those plants over their lifetimes.302  States’ 
methodologies for valuing externalities vary considerably.303  The key point, however, is that 
                                                
295 See supra Part II.B. 
296 See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1733 
(2011) (describing spectrum of judicial deference). 
297 But see Allison M. Macfarlane, Chairman, NRC, Remarks to the National Press Club (Nov. 17, 2014) (prepared 
remarks available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/2014/s-14-012.pdf) (“I 
believe it’s time for the NRC to develop regulations specific to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, both 
to help utilities through decommissioning and to structure public expectations of the process.”). 
298 Energy Policy Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).  
299 SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, A BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND 
REQUIREMENTS (2011), http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final_2011-04-
28.pdf.   
300 For a helpful description of how Arizona, Colorado and Oregon use integrated resource planning, see Rachel 
Wilson & Bruce Biewald, Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning, REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT WHITE PAPER (June 2013). 
301 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
302 See, e.g. Boyd, supra note 20, at 1695-96 (collecting examples); Wilson & Biewald, supra note 300, at 16-25 
(same). 
303 For one example, see MINN. STAT. § 216B.243(3)(a)(1994).  The statute requires the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission to “quantify and establish a range of environmental costs associated with each method of electricity 
generation.”  Id. § 216B.2422(3)(a); see also In the Matter of Quantification of Environmental Costs, 578 N.W.2d 
794 (Minn. App. 1998) (upholding PUC regulations); Re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 150 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 
(PUR), at 137 (explaining how environmental externalities are quantified in Minnesota); Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K, 
Adair, The Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation:  Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and 
Consumer Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 40-41 (2013) (collecting further examples of state PUCs 
considering environmental factors in exercise of general authority).  Valuation is a complex process, but resources 
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some states incorporate externalities into decisions about which plants to build, if not into 
decisions about which plants to dispatch to serve load.   
Once again, this approach is most easily achieved in states that can guarantee a return on 
investment.  If plants are to operate in the wholesale markets and those markets remain at status 
quo, a state’s choice of generation mix may not be most optimal where only cost is directly 
valued directly.  In other words, if a state favors generation sources that produce fewer 
externalities but that have higher marginal costs, those sources will not fare as well in the market.  
This may help explain why new nuclear reactor construction is currently taking place only in 
traditionally regulated states.  A look at those states’ approaches illustrates additional policy 
options at the state level.  It also suggests that regulated states may have more flexibility than 
restructured states to influence how cost, reliability, and lack of externalities are optimized.     
One policy initiative at the state level is to authorize utilities to collect from customers 
the carrying costs of major projects during the lengthy construction phase.  The Georgia Nuclear 
Financing Act, enacted just after Southern Company sought authorization from Georgia’s PUC 
to construct the Vogtle units, permits Southern Company to collect from ratepayers the financing 
costs of Vogtle during its construction.304  A South Carolina statute, by contrast, permits 
recovery of carrying costs for utilities seeking to construct base load plants, which are defined as 
new coal or nuclear generation with generating capacity of 350 megawatts or greater.305  As yet 
another example, Florida’s PUC has issued a rule permitting recovery of carrying costs for new 
nuclear construction.306  These initiatives are not without controversy; sustained opposition 
illustrates that even with state support, the nuclear risk premium remains.307   
In regions where competitive wholesale markets exist, states have sought creative ways 
to compensate existing nuclear generation for its reliability and environmental value, 
notwithstanding the market’s failure to do so.  For example, a study by the New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO) concluded that if the aging R.E. Ginna nuclear power 
plant in New York were to retire, its loss would result in numerous bulk-transmission system and 
non-bulk local distribution system reliability violations.308  As a result, New York’s Public 
Service Commission approved Exelon’s request to seek a reliability support services agreement 
                                                                                                                                                       
are available.  See e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE (2009); Nicholas Muller & Robert Mendelson, Efficient Pollution Regulation:  
Getting the Prices Right, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1714 (2009); Ian F. Roth and Lawrence L. Ambs, Incorporating 
Exernalities into a Full Cost Approach to Electric Power Generation Life-Cycle Costing, 29 ENERGY 2125 (2004). 
304 By its terms, the Act’s most specific provisions applied only to nuclear plants certified by the state PUC between 
January 1, 2009 and July 1, 2009, making Southern the only eligible company.  See O.C.G.A. § 46-2-25(c)(3); 
Fulton Co. Taxpayers Found. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. 2010) (holding plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge PUC certification and statute).  Note that NRC’s COL licenses issued February 10, 2012.  
Contingent on cost recovery is Southern’s duty to make frequent reports to the PUC. This reporting process has 
revealed that the current construction is over budget and behind schedule.  See also Thomas Overton, Even More 
Delays and Cost Overruns for Vogtle Expansion, WWW.POWERMAG.COM, Feb. 2, 2015 (detailing new reports of cost 
overruns and delays, as well as construction litigation). 
305 Base Load Review Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-220(2) (2011).  In the case of coal, the statute specifies that such 
plants are required to comply with Best Available Control Technology for air emissions, as defined by EPA.  Id.  
306 See Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In re Proposed Adoption of New Rule Regarding Nuclear Power Plant Cost 
Recovery, No. 060508, 2007 WL 869063 (Mar. 20, 2007).   
307 See Fulton Cnty. Taxpayers’ Found., Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. 2010) (upholding 
judgment against PUC arising out of Vogtle certification). 
308 NEW YORK INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY STUDY FOR EXELON CORP.:  EVALUATION OF THE 
IMPACT OF THE RETIREMENT OF THE GINNA NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION ON THE NEW YORK STATE 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (May 12, 2014). 
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with a transmission owner in order to keep the plant operating despite its loss of a long-term 
power contract and inability to operate in the low-priced power market.309  According to some 
estimates, the new power contract would charge over eighty percent more than wholesale 
rates.310  But the Commission reasoned that the power source’s reliability and carbon-free 
capability made it a key asset in the state’s generation fleet.311   
Other state activities echo the notion that reliability as an attribute is undervalued.  Ohio’s 
PUC, for example, is considering whether to permit a rate rider in its retail rates to make up for 
low wholesale rates in order to retain existing nuclear capacity.312  Consider also the Illinois 
House of Representatives’ recent resolution calling on various state agencies to prepare reports 
“showing how the premature closure of existing nuclear power plants in Illinois will affect” 
reliability and capacity for the Midwest region, increased GHG emissions, and the state’s 
economy.313  The resolution instructed agencies to include findings about potential market-based 
solutions to avoid premature closings of the state’s nuclear power plants.  Among the 
resolution’s findings were the importance of nuclear power to meeting EPA’s Clean Power Plan 
proposal, ensuring reliability and capacity, and preserving numerous nuclear-power related jobs 
in the state.314   
The report, issued January 25, 2015, considered several market-based solutions:  relying 
purely on the existing market; a cap-and-trade program; a carbon tax; a low-carbon portfolio 
standard; and a sustainable power planning standard.315  For all of the options, however, it 
recommended further research, cautioning that any approach directed at nuclear power plants 
“should be mindful of the looming Clean Power Plan compliance requirements.”316  So far, the 
low-carbon portfolio standard appears to have the most traction.317  In fact, this possibility relates 
to another important state initiative already noted in Part I: RPSs.  RPSs have grown steadily in 
numbers and strength since the early 1980s, and today two-thirds of the states have in place some 
form of RPS.318   RPSs vary considerably in their design, but they typically specify some 
percentage of electricity sales within a state that must or should be attributable to renewable fuel 
sources.319  Developments in federal law—particularly, the proposed Clean Power Plan—as well 
                                                
309 Barry Cassell, Exelon, Rochester still working on life-saving deal for Ginna nuclear plant, GENERATION HUB, 
Feb. 6, 2015, http://generationhub.com/2015/02/06/exelon-rochester-still-working-on-life-saving-deal.  
310 Naureen S. Malik & Jim Polson, New York Reactor’s Survival Tests Pricey Nuclear, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 5, 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-05/new-york-reactor-s-survival-tests-pricey-nuclear.html.  
311 Id.; see also NEI, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 2  (Feb. 2015) (concluding 
plant is “significant economic contributor to the region and New York”). 
312 But see PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding Ney Jersey’s Long Term 
Capacity Pilot Program Act preempted by Federal Power Act because it regulated wholesale capacity prices; statute 
was aimed at attracting new natural gas generation); PPL Energyplus v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(similar).   
313 H.R. 1146, 98th Gen. Assembly, at 8) (Ill. 2014). 
314 Id. at 1-4. In addition, the resolution also called on FERC and RTOs to adopt rules and policies to help ensure the 
continued operation of nuclear power plants. Id. at 6. 
315 ILL. COMM. COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS, OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 25, 2015), 
available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/electricity/hr1146.aspx.  
316 Ill. Report, supra note 250, at 158-59.   
317 See Steve Daniels, Exelon proposes surcharge on power bills legislation expected soon, CRAIN’S, Feb. 24, 2015, 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150224/NEWS11/150229921/exelon-proposes-surcharge-on-power-
bills-legislation-expected-soon.  
318 For an up-to-date list, see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, www.dsireusa.org 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
319 Id. 
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as a growing appreciation for other low-carbon resources, have pushed some states to revise their 
RPSs to emphasize carbon neutrality rather than renewable fuels per se.  Ohio, for example, has 
a low-carbon standard, which mandates that by 2025, half the mandated 25% must come from 
renewables, while the other half must come from sources like third-generation nuclear power, 
energy efficiency, and clean coal technology.320   As described in Part I, RPSs function as 
indirect influences on cost, permitting sources meeting the standards to bid lower willing-to-
accept prices into the wholesale markets.   
In considering state options, one question is whether regulated states have any advantage 
over restructured states.  Certainly the ability to guarantee rate recovery for construction carrying 
costs, as exemplified by Georgia’s example, is far clearer in states that utilize traditional notions 
of the state regulatory contract, including cost recovery.  Note, however, that this traditional 
approach to incentivizing investment is not unique to nuclear power, or to traditionally regulated 
state markets.  Remember that even in competitive markets, the rates of transmission and 
distribution (“wires”) companies remain regulated.  So wires companies can recover their 
investments in smart meters and grid storage, for example, which are also aimed at enhancing 
grid reliability.321  
But recent experience also suggests that restructured and regulated states face different 
regulatory landscapes that impact the menu of available options.  Consider the following.  In the 
early 2000s, two states in the eastern portion of PJM, New Jersey and Maryland, grew 
dissatisfied with wholesale electricity prices in eastern PJM.  Policymakers in both states 
concluded that the PJM capacity market was not inducing sufficient investment in new 
generation facilities in eastern PJM, and undertook to subsidize construction of new natural-gas 
fired generation within their state borders.   Reasoning that these subsidies would distort prices in 
the PJM market, in 2014 two different federal circuit courts overturned each of these two subsidy 
programs as preempted by the FPA, which grants the FERC exclusive authority to regulate 
wholesale rates.322  A key part of both courts’ rationale was that by restructuring, the states had 
thrown “their lot with the federal interstate markets” and relinquished their former regulatory 
autonomy.323  Thus, even though the states still retained authority over siting and construction, 
by giving up their authority to set electricity rates under the traditional approach, they had also 
limited their ability to compensate for distortions that generators within their borders might 
encounter.324  
 
3.  Regional Initiatives 
 
                                                
320 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64 (West 2012).  Cf. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 
2014) (striking down portions of Minnesota low-carbon standard on dormant Commerce Clause grounds).      
321 Recovery remains subject to PUCs’ decisionmaking and state law.  See Eisen, supra note 271, at 17-20 
(describing obstacles); see also Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:  Adapting Public Utility Commissions 
to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2014) (noting challenges and 
solutions). 
322 PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed Dec. 10, 2014 (holding New 
Jersey effort to compensate new generation for capacity market disparities was preempted by Federal Power Act); 
PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed Nov. 26, 2014 (similar). 
323 Nazarian, 745 F.3d at 473; see also Solomon, 766 F.3d at 748 (“New Jersey divorced the entities that generate 
electricity from those that supply it.”). 
324 E.g., 766 F.3d at 248. 
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Much like the federal initiatives, regional attempts to push electricity markets to better 
value environmental and reliability concerns are largely disaggregated. Environmental 
considerations have emerged as a result of state cooperation, influencing the cost of what is 
traded on the wholesale markets.  A notable example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), which is a voluntary carbon trading regime created by a group of northeastern states.325  
There are few other examples, suggesting the potential to do more but also reinforcing the 
governance issues described above.  Notably, the Clean Power Plan envisions state cooperation 
to achieve GHG emission-reduction goals, suggesting at the very least federal support of region-
driven approaches.      
Reliability, by contrast, has generally been the concern of multiple layers of 
governmental and private sector actors, including FERC, the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC),326 regional reliability entities overseen by NERC,327 RTOs/ISOs, and 
states.  Every NERC region has an established reserve margin target, or desired amount of 
available generation over and above anticipated peak demand.  In NERC regions dominated by 
traditionally regulated, vertically integrated electric utilities, meeting the reserve margin target is 
a simple matter because utilities have an incentive to invest in generation.328  In areas with 
wholesale markets overseen by RSOs/ISOs, capacity markets, mentioned in Part I, represent 
another way to try to meet reserve margin targets.   
To date, capacity markets have not attempted to place a value on fuel diversity or social 
costs.329  Indeed, it is the failure of competitive wholesale markets to reward the combination of 
reliability and low emissions that has led states like Illinois, New York, and Ohio to consider 
incentives to keep plants open, as described in the previous section.  Capacity markets could 
explicitly incorporate fuel diversity into their selection criteria to avoid these problems.   On the 
other hand, regional capacity planning presents collective action problems, which in turn can 
present federalism problems, as the examples of New Jersey and Maryland above reveal. Given 
the conflicts between states in the eastern and western portions of PJM, moreover,330 it is not 
difficult to imagine that disputes will erupt within regional entities over attempts to value fuel 
diversity or social costs in capacity markets.  
The Texas grid operator has eschewed capacity markets in favor of letting wholesale 
prices rise to cap of $9,000/MWh (as compared with average prices of less than $50/MWh) as a 
way of rewarding investment in new capacity.331  However, concerned that high prices alone 
might not be a sufficient incentive, Texas regulators have explored intervening in ancillary 
                                                
325 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
326 Section 215 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the FERC to appoint and oversee a national electric 
reliability organization.  16 U.S.C. § 824o.  FERC appointed NERC to this role in 2006.  Order Certifying North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation as the Electric Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance Filing, 
161 FERC 61,062 (2006). 
327 The boundaries of these regional entities correspond roughly to the boundaries of RTOs/ISOs in organized power 
markets.  See NERC, REGIONAL ENTITIES, http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/Regional-
Entities.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (showing boundaries). 
328 This effect is attributed to the cost-of-service approach to ratemaking.  See sources cited supra note 143.  
329 See NEI, News:  Exelon on the 2014 PJM Capacity Market Auction, June 12, 2014, http://www.nei.org/News-
Media/News/News-Archives/Exelon-on-the-2014-PJM-Capacity-Market-Auction (critizing PJM capacity planning 
process because it “reveals that the market does not sufficiently recognize the significant value that nuclear plants 
provide in terms of reliability and environmental benefits.”). 
330 Supra text accompanying note 260. 
331 ERCOT, SYSTEM-WIDE OFFER CAP AND SCARCITY PRICING MECHANISM METHODOLOGY 5 (Apr. 2013) (on file 
with authors). 
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services markets to increase payments to providers of ancillary services (essentially, a reliability 
adder), which are very short-term reserves.332  Traditionally, the grid operator dispatches 
reserves the same way it dispatches other generation resources, using the SCED rule.     
In any of the wholesale markets, one could conceivably interject social costs into the 
dispatch system as well, through the use of adders in the dispatch process.  The idea behind 
social cost dispatch is to modify current SCED rules by adding to each source’s bid cost an 
estimate of that facility’s marginal social costs (that is, estimated marginal value of its external 
costs).  This is conceptually straightforward, but extremely complex in practice.  In theory, such 
adders would be equivalent to the imposition of optimal emissions tax,333 imposed only on 
electric generators.  The adder would, like the tax, force firms to internalize an optimal amount 
of external costs. 
There are scholars who have proposed methods of full social cost (or 
“environmental/economic”) dispatch;334 but others believe it is unworkable.335 EPA’s recently-
proposed Clean Power Plan aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector 
by encouraging (but not requiring) states to dispatch cleaner sources of power—nuclear, natural 
gas, and renewables in place of coal,336 thereby introducing environmental considerations into 
dispatch decisions directly.337  But that plan has met with hostility from Republican appointees to 
FERC, precisely because it would represent a step toward an “environmental dispatch” model.338  
Thus, even if such costs could be calculated appropriately, the political viability of such an 
approach is questionable.  
 
                                                
332 See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., PROJECT 40000:  COMMISSION PROCEEDING TO ENSURE RESOURCE ADEQUACY 
IN TEXAS, http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/projects/electric/40000/40000.aspx (providing information and 
documents). 
333 Theoretically, the tax should be set a price that will induce generators to reduce pollution to the point at which the 
marginal benefit of the next unit of pollution equals its marginal cost.  THOMAS TIETENBERG ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 52-54 (1992). 
334 See, e.g., Stephen Bernow et al., Full-Cost Dispatch:  Incorporating Environmental Externalities in Electric 
System Operation, 4 ELEC. J. 20 (1991) (advocating full social cost dispatch, while acknowledging difficult 
implementation problems).  A number of engineers have proposed algorithms for accomplishing full social cost 
dispatch.  See, e.g., M.A. Abido, Environmental Economic Power Dispatch Using Multiobjective Evolutionary 
Algorithms, 18 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS 1529 (2003); Simona Dinu et al., Environmental 
Economic Dispatch Optimization Using a Modified Genetic Algorithm, 20 INTL. J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 975 
(2011); Terje Gjengedal et al., Environmental Objectives in Power Production Unit Commitment and Dispatch, 
ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS (Aug.-Sept. 1992), available at  
http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/1992/data/papers/SS92_Panel9_Paper08.pdf; Mimoun Younes et al., 
Environmental/Economic Power Dispatch Problem, PROCEEDINGS: 2013 CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY 
ECOSYSTEMS, AND DEVELOPMENT, available at 
http://www.europment.org/library/2013/venice/bypaper/EEEAD/EEEAD-24.pdf. 
335 Perhaps the most prominent scholar opposing full social cost dispatch is William Hogan.  See William W. Hogan, 
Electricity Market Design:  Environmental Dispatch, HARV. ELEC. POL’Y GRP. WORKING PAPER (Dec. 4, 2014).   
336 Clean Power Plan, supra note 10, at 34,856.  The Plan would establish emissions budgets for each state based, in 
part, on assumptions about how much each state can dispatch cleaner technologies in place of coal-fired power. 
337 This has provoked complaints from opponents of the proposed plan who argue that a system of “environmental 
dispatch” violates the just and reasonable rate requirement.  See generally Hogan, supra note 335.   
338 See Written Testimony of FERC Comm’r Philip D. Moeller Before the Comm. on Energy & Commerce 
Subcomm. on Energy & Power, H.R Hearing on FERC Perspective: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean 
Power Plan and other Grid Reliability Challenges, July 29, 2014, available at  
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140729091755-Moeller-07-29-2014.pdf (also arguing that environmental 
dispatch is unworkable). 





 If the foregoing discussion makes daunting the prospect of fully realizing the vision of an 
efficient, reliable, and green grid, it also suggests reasons for optimism.  Numerous actors at 
every governance level have made efforts towards this vision, and there is room for far more 
experimentation.  This observation, however, returns us to our starting point:  what do all of 
these developments mean for the regulatory contract? We contend that part of the answer lies in 
the increasing heterogeneity observable across and among governance levels.  The regulatory 
contract has long passed the point of being defined by two parties and a nineteenth-century 
purpose.   
 Instead, the regulatory contract is better conceived as a network, loosely bound by the 
contours of markets as well as the initiatives of multiple layers of government and private actors.  
But more work is needed to fully align this concept within the dual-visioned, clean and efficient 
grid.  As we have shown, a number of mismatches between old regulatory regimes and dynamic 
markets have resulted in a failure to value some attributes of electricity.  The experience of 
nuclear power demonstrates some of these mismatches.  Prospective new entrants are 
disincentivized to construct high-capital projects with an added risk premium; current players are 
being priced out of the markets, notwithstanding their reliable, clean contribution to the grid.   
 It is of great interest, then, that the prospect for new nuclear power seems best in states 
that embrace more traditional notions of the regulatory contract.  On the other hand, those states 
have been innovative, using the regulatory contract as a tool rather than a static construct.  And 
the reactors under construction today were incentivized as well by federal initiatives designed to 
overcome at least some of the nuclear risk premium.  Note as well that restructured states are 
also considering innovative ways to maintain the reliability and environmental benefits of their 
existing fleets.  These developments are of special significance considering that they have taken 
place in a field—atomic energy law—long perceived as requiring a unified, preemptive federal 
presence.  Overall, this context points to the need for further research that considers various 
policy options in tandem, rather than in isolation.  If the regulatory contract is a network, its 
component parts must be so analyzed.  
 This analysis illustrates that the legal framework within which the markets operate shapes 
those markets.  The move from comprehensive regulation and administrative price-setting to 
competition and market prices does not obviate the need for regulation.  To the contrary, 
regulatory institutions matter because competitive markets sometimes fail to supply valued 
products and services, just as modern electricity markets under-supply valued attributes of 
electricity generation by focusing on minimizing costs.  If we are to truly pursue a low-cost, 
reliable, and green grid, we must view the regulatory contract as a flexible mechanism—one that 
can incorporate a variety of policy options, at multiple governance levels, to change the inputs to 
the markets or even alter the markets themselves.  
 
